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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the ways in which legal 
remedies can be used in order to achieve the goals of 
resource management. However, the discussion is 
confined to remedies available under the common law. 
The introduction sets out the background to the study 
and defines the nature of the problem. Chapter One 
outlines the constitutional principles underlying the 
legal system which define the scope of the courts' power. 
An appreciation of the courts' cons~itutional position 
is essential for understanding both the limits and the 
potential of the courts' role. 
Chapter Two discusses the major private law 
actions applicable to resource management problems. 
These are the torts actions of trespass, nuisance, 
public nuisance, negligence, breach of statutory duty, 
r. It concludes that 
their very nature as private law actions entails serious 
disadvantages from the perspective of resource management 
which is concerned with the public interest. Of these 
actions public nuisance is best suited to dealing with 
resource management problems. 
Chapter Three deals with the public law remedy 
of judicial review. This remedy is designed to ensure 
that administrative agencies operate within the limits 
of power delegated to them by the legislature. Because 
of the nature of this remed~ resource management issues 
iv 
can not be examined on their merits. Nevertheless, 
in spite of its limitations, judicial review can be a 
useful tool for achieving resource management goals. 
The final chapter examines the arguments for 
and against expanding the role of the courts in resolving 
resource management disputes. It focuses on the Michigan 
Environmental Protection Act as an example of potential 
measures in overcoming the limitations of the common law 
in dealing with resource issues. 
INTRODUCTION 
The controversial High Court decision to deny 
water rights for the Clyde High Dam and the even more 
controversial decision of Parliament to override the 
Court's decision by enacting the Clutha Development 
(Clyde Dam) Empowering Act 1982 are now part of our 
1 
resource development histbry. But the saga of the dam, 
for a brief period, focussed public attention on the 
role of the courts in resource related disputes. It 
was clear from the public discussion surrounding these 
events that the function of the courts within our legal 
system is not well understood. 2 This prompted the 
present study, which examines the role of the courts 
within the legal system from the perspective of resource 
management. 
It seemed important to undertake an examination of 
the role of the courts from this perspective for a number 
of reasons. Inevitably, improper understanding of their 
role results in failures to take advantage of opportunities 
for the courts to make significant contributions to the 
resolution of resource management problems. On the other 
hand, where inappropriate demands are made of them, problems 
which might have been resolvable by other means may remain 
unresolved or be resolved in a less satisfactory Olanner. 
Lac]t of understanding of their role can also lead to 
misdirected criticism of their performance which serves 
2 
only to divert attention away from desirable reform of 
other institutions or away from the failure of other 
institutions to undertake reforms which are within their 
powers. Furthermore, it is necessary to understand the 
wider role of the courts in the legal system before making 
any recommendations for improvement of the court~' role 
from a resource management perspective. 
The recently announced intention of the Government 
to introduce a Bill of Rights into Parliament gives an 
added reason for examining the role of the courts. If 
the Bill of Rights were to be extended beyond the tradi-
tional range of subject matter for such documents to 
include environmental rights, it would significantly alter 
the existing role of the courts from a resource management 
perspective. An examination of the strengths and weaknesses 
of the judicial approach to decision making can assist 
discussion of whether or not it would be desirable to seek 
inclusion of environmental rights. 
With these issues in mind, this study has four 
objectives: to improve the understanding of those 
concerned with resource management of the role the courts 
are able to play in the resolution of resource management 
. issues; to outline their strengths and weaknesses in 
this regard; to examine briefly potential means of 
remedying any weaknesses; and finally to consider the 
ramifications of any such proposed changes. 
CHAPTER I 
CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter examines the position of the courts 
and the Judiciary within our constitutional system as a 
necessary preliminary to the discussion of the role the 
courts are able to play with respect to resource management 
problems, which follows in subsequent chapters. 
Three fundamental concepts underpin our constitutional 
system: the concept of the rule of law, the doctrine of 
separation of powers, and the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty. Together these determine the role of the 
courts and the bounds of their power. 
The meaning of the rule of law is not easy to define 
concisely. It is a complex concept with shades of meaning 
that vary with the context. But at the core of the concept 
is the view that the relationship of power between those. 
who govern and those who are governed should be regulated 
by the idea of law. In essence, this means that every 
act of governmental power affecting the legal rights, 
duties, or liberties of a citizen must be authorised by 
either Act of Parliament or decision of the courts. 
However a further gloss needs to be added to this. So 
baldly stated, the rule could be satisfied by an enactment 
giving government unrestricted discretionary powers. 
This would permit rule by arbitrary power rather than 
in accordance with ascertainable law. Hence the rule 
4 
is taken to demand in addition "that government should 
be conducted within a fram6work of recognised rules and 
principles which restr ict discretionary power. II (Wade, 
1977) 1 The concept as described would also be hollow 
without the essential corollary that everyone is subject 
to the law, including the government. 
Two consequences which are relev~nt for our purposes 
follow from these points. First, citizens must have 
recourse to legal suit. against the State where the State 
is in breach of the concept. Second, the State must 
guarantee the protection of the law against interference 
with the legal rights of citizens by other citizens or 
the State. (Aubert, 1983) 
The Judiciary occupies a central position in the 
rule of law ideology, which emphasises the controlling 
power of independent and authoritative courts. It is 
their function to uphold the rule of law. The importance 
attached to an independent Judiciary interrelates closely 
with the doctrine of separation of powers but entails 
some conflict with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, 
which will be returned to below. 
The emergence of the concept in its modern form 2 
took place alongside the growth of free market ideology 
and a view of the state in which it was the task of govern-
ment "to create and enforce a set of constituent rules, 
to defend law and order, while simultaneously granting 
the citizenry the freedom to choose its own strategies 
wi thin this frameworl\. II (Aubert, 1983) The main task 
5 
of legal authorities was to ensure that property and contracts 
were pr6tected. The law was seen as providing a stable 
environment for individual action and thus both complemented 
and assisted the free market. (van Gunsteren, 1976) 
Clearly, those with existing property rights had more 
to gain from guarantees of rule in accordance with law 
. as the concept was traditionally conceived. 
However, the theory of state under which the concept 
dSveloped is no longer the dominant one today. The tradi-
tional flaw-state! model, with its relatively passive and 
circumscribed view of the proper role of the State has 
been replaced by the welfare state model. The welfare 
state is one in which the State itself controls a large 
share of resources, it shares responsibility for economic 
growth with the market system, and provides guarantees 
against certain events which are beyond the control of 
either the State itself or its citizens. Under this 
model the law is increasingly used as a means of promoting 
. social change. The State is more powerful than under the 
law-state model where its central function was protection 
6f the individual citizen's sphere of freedom. The range 
of activities undertaken by the welfare state requires 
greater use of discretion to function efficiently. The 
growth of discretionary power has outpaced growth of the 
rules designed to control abuse of discretion. Not only 
.has this tended to make the courts appear increasingly 
irrelevant but it also places the rule of law itself at 
risk. This situation seems to have arisen, at least in 
6 
part, from failure to adapt the other two major constitu-
tional concepts to the realities of the modern state. 
If the rule of law is to remain a worthwhile ideal (and 
there are no obvious competitors) the courts will have 
to develop their techniques for upholding it in a way 
that takes greater account of these realities. The issues 
raised by this situation are dealt with in chapters three 
and four. 
3 The doctrine of the separation of powers rests 
on the sound proposition that concentration of power in 
the hands of one group or person leads to despotism and 
threat to individual liberty. According to the doctrine 
each of the three main classes of governmental function, 
legislative, executive (or administrative) and judicial, 
should be kept distinct and be exercised by separate agencies. 
But rigid adherence to the doctrine has never been more 
than a theoretical ideal. In spite of this, it remains 
a useful guideline and an important means of helping to 
ensure government under the rule of law. 
New Zealand has three main branches of State corres-
ponding to the three classes of function in accordance 
with the doctrine: the Legislature (or Parliament), the 
executive (comprising the Executive Council,4 Cabinet, 
government departments and agencies, local and regional 
government) and the Judiciary (or the courts). It is 
the role of Parliament to ena6t new laws, that of the 
Executive to enforce and administer tile laws, as well 
as determining policy within the framework of those laws, 
7 
and it is the role of the courts to apply and interpret 
the law where disputes arise between either citizens and 
the State or between citi~en and citizen. Although this 
division of function corresponds with the theory of the 
separation of powers, such a broad description of function 
glosses over significant divergences from the theoretical 
ideal .-
The role of the courts is not confined to declaring 
and applying the meaning of statutes. Not all of our 
law is derived from statutes. Over the centuries the 
courts have themselves developed a body of law known as 
the common law to distinguish it from statutory law. 
Much former common law has been codified into statutory 
form or modified by statute but where it remains unaffected 
by statute, the courts enjoy a freedom to alter or develop 
the law which they do not have with statute law. In 
doing this they are effectively law-making. But application 
of the common law was not always perceived as law-making. 
The courts,were said.to be declaring what the law had 
always been, which raised no conflict with the doctrine 
of separation of powers. This is now recognised as a 
fiction. (Lloyd, 1977, 1979)5 With this recognition 
the .confli~t can no longer be ignored but judicial law-making 
is sufficiently distinct from legislation to retain a 
meaningful separation of function. 
The difference is one of scope. Legislation has 
no procedural or substantive bounds. (Cappelletti, -1975 
1981) The legislator is free to make innovative changes 
8 
as he sees fit and to deal abstractly with future situations. 
Judicial law-making does not deal abstractly with the future. 
It is grounded in and constrained by the issues in the 
litigation before it (which is not to say that judges 
do not bear in mind the fDture consequences of their decisions). 
(Lloyd t 1979) Because judicial law-making arises in 
response to sporadic litigation it is necessarily gradual 
and limited in effects. Furthermore t the doctrine of 
6 precedent ensures that development usually proceeds by 
analogy with established principle (although new principles 
may be laid down). If the courts were to attempt sweeping 
reform they would clearly be overstepping their constitDtion~1 
role. 
However t there is room for divergence of opinion 
as to when judges have stepped beyond the bounds of legitimate 
law-making. The extent to which judges should expand the 
common law is the subject of considerable debate. 7 
New Zealand courts have tended to adopt a conservative 
stance. On the other hand in respect of the related 
issue of whether the courts should extend principles found 
in statute by analogy to like situations, there is reasonable 
concensus against their assuming such power. (Burrows, 
1976) Filling in gaps in statutes by analogy is a charac-
teristic feature of the European Civil Law and it is an 
approach that is favoured by some prominent Common Law 
jurists, including Lord Scarman (1974). Long-standing 
adherence to the fiction that judges don't make law in 
order to maintain the apperance of strict conformity to 
9 
the separation of powers has hindered the development 
of "guidelines to govern the proper limits of judicial 
law-making . 
. Divergence from the strict theory of separation 
of powers is even more apparent in relation to the executive 
branch. The demands of the welfare state have resulted 
in an increasing quantity of law-making being carried 
out by the Executive. Such law is collectively referred 
to as subordinate or delegated legislation8 . It must 
be au~horised by Act of Parli~ment9 and accord with any 
conditions set down in the empowering statute. So great 
is the quantity of this form of legislation that it now 
exceeds statutes in volume . (O'Keefe and Farrands, 1976) 
.. Furthermore, the Executive effectively control 
the making of statutory law. Although the power to pass 
statutes remains strictly that of Parliament, the party 
system has given rise to a situation in which Parliament 
is dominated and controlled by the government of the day. 
This contrasts with the situation in the United States 
'where the President and his appointees (tho Executive) 
cannot be members of Congress (the law-making branch). 
Overlapping melnbership of the executive and legislative 
branches under our sys~em clearly conflicts with the ideal 
of the separation of powers, limiting the effectiveness 
of Parliament in restraining the power of the Executive. 
As a consequence one might expect to find our JudiciRry 
more vigorous than its American counterparts in protecting 
citizens against abuse of power. That this is not so 
10 
is attributable in no small measure to the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty (coupled with judicial self-
restraint in deference to the theory of separation of 
power) . 
In essence, the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
means that there is no legal limit to the power of parliament 
to make and r al legislation. Unlike those countries 
which have a written constitution or a bill of rights 
containing fundamental principles against which legislation 
can be judged and set aside if it contravenes those 
principles, in our system no person or body is recognised 
\ as having a right to override or set aside an Act of parliament 
th d tl t . t . t' t t' 1 10 on - e groun s 1a l' 1S uncons 1 u-10na . This means 
that our courts have a more restricted role than their 
counterparts operating under a written constitution. 
This would be alter if proposals to enact a Bill of 
Rights proceeds. Indeed, our courts lack the security 
of status that a written constitution setting down their 
1 . 11 ro e glves. If, for example, Parliament believed they 
had overstepped the limits of judicial law-making or had 
intervened too much in controlling the Executive it could 
curtail their jurisdiction. Respect for convention and 
public opinion are the only real safeguards against any 
such action. 
It should be noted that it is implicit in the doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty that Parliament can legislate 
to override a judicial decision. It is, of course, in 
accordance with democratic theory that parliament should 
1 1 
have final law-making power. But there is inherent potential 
for conflict with the rule of law and the separation of 
powers if Parliament does not respect the convention that 
it ~ay override a judicial decision for the future but 
not overturn the actual. decision between the parties. 
Failure to observe ~his convention was at the heart of 
the Clyde controversy. 
It may have been fear of having their wings clipped 
that has resulted in what some commentators 12 view as 
the excessive deference paid by the English judges to 
the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty which has charac-
.terised judicial attitudes for most of this century. 
With a few notable exceptions they have shown unwillingness 
to extend old doctrines or develop new ones. Where the 
common law has conflicted with modern conditions they 
have usually left it to Parliament to remedy the situation. 
In the'area of statutory interpretation they have constrained 
t1 1 b l 't I' t t t' 13 lemse ves y 1 era In"erpre a lons. These comments 
apply with equal force to New Zealand judges. 
This judicial timidity was reinforced in England 
by a ruling of the House of Lords 14 that it was bound 
to follow its own previous decisions, a ruling whjch stood 
until 1966. The New Zealand Court of Appeal never adopted 
such a strict approach, although it did generally follow 
its previous decisions. But the English ruling inevitably 
'influenced the development of'our law because House of 
Lords decisions are frequently followed. 
Deference to both parliamentary sovereignty and 
12 
the sepa~ation of powers led the courts to insist upon 
excluding policy issues in reaching decisions. The result 
was that the courts came to be viewed as increasingly 
irrelevant for dealing with the injustices and problems 
of modern society (Abel-Smith and Stevens, 1967) 
The position in England and New Zealand contrasted 
strongly with that of the United States, where the courts 
were very active in extending doctrines and developing 
new ones. It is easy to suggest that this happened because 
the courts there have power to review legislation. Indeed 
part of this activity did arise from the power to review, 
but by no means all of it. They were also active in 
expanding the common law to meet changing social conditions. 
This included efforts to deal with the increasingly pressing 
problems of natural resources management. It may be 
that the power to review legislation encourages a greater 
disposition to develop the common law as well. 
However, from around 1955 there was a shift in 
attitude on the part of the English judges. Stimulated 
by the Lord Chancellor of the day, Lord Kilmuir, who 
believed the courts should help solve social problems, 
the courts began to take a more active role in adapting 
the common law and also began to take a broader approach 
to statutory interpretation. (Abel-Smith and Stevens, 
1967) The New Zealand courts have participated in this 
trend toward greater activism. Mr Justice Cooke, (1975) 
ref~rring specifically to environmental problems, has 
13 
stated that 'the common law is not yet past the age of 
child~bearing. ' This promises hope for the development 
of the common law in response to resource management prob-
lems, within the constraints of the courts' constitutional 
role. The extent of any such development will depend 
upon prevailing views as to the proper limits of judicial 
activism. 
In the follow chapters I turn to an examination 
of those aspects of the common law relevant to resource 
management. For convenience the discussion is broken 
into two parts, one dealing with private law and one dealing 
with public law. This is a conventional distinction. 
The nature of the actions and remedies available are quite 
different, reflecting their respective emphasis on private 
and public rights. 15 I I with the court's role in 
interpreting statutes only indirectly. It would be another 
study in itself to examine the court's interpretation 
of statutes relating to resource management. 
14 
CHAPTEn TWO . 
, ; \. 
PRIVATE LAW ACTIONS 
Over the centuries the common law has developed 
a group of actions, collectively known as the law of torts, 
which are concerned with adjustment of the risks and 
losses that are an inevitable by-product of social contact. 
Although the law of torts uses the language of rights, 
dutiesi and interests, essentially, in adjusting ri 
and losses, judges are involved in a resource allocating 
task. For that reason, this branch of private law has 
potential to assist in dealing with the problems which 
are of central concern to resource management; the 
problems of environmental degradation and resource 
scarcity. It is a branch of law which by its very nature 
is continually evolving to take into account changing 
social conditions and changing social and moral values. 
Even at the height of their deference to the doctrines of 
parliamentary sovereignty and separation of powers, the 
judges never entirely abandoned the t of developing 
the law of torts to meet new situations. But in spite 
of the trend for judges once again to play a more active 
role in develop the law, the potentj of torts from 
a resource management perspective has scarcely been 
explored in New Zealand. Although the issue has been 
tile subject of limited discussion in the legal literature', 
on the whole it has not developed into R body of concrete 
case lRw through litigation, as lIas happened in the United 
15 
States. 
There is no single cause of action which is 
suitable for dealing with resource management problems. 
The law does not recognise any general right to a safe, 
healthful, productive' and aesthetically pleasing environment. 
There are six different causes of action in tort which 
may be applicable, with varying degrees of suitability, 
to the resolution of resource management problems: 
trespass to land, nuisance, public nuisance, negligence, 
breach of statutory duty, and what is known as the rule 
,in Rylands v. Fletcher. The present nature of these 
actions is the product of a complex history of development, 
reflecting the particular social conditions to which they 
were a response. 
(i) Tresp~ss 
The action of trespass protects the interest of 
the plaintiff in having his land free from physical 
intrusion. (Street, 1983) Although in the past the 
action has most commonly been associated with unauthorised 
entry by a person onto the land of another, the intrusion 
referred to is not confined to that of people or indeed 
animals. It may be by any physical matter, including 
~ 2 
smbke and particulates and probably gases. Hence, 
trespass may be turned into a useful weapon to help control 
pollution. The act causing the invasion must be either 
intentional or negligent 3 , that is, not purely accidental 
or involuntary, and the invasion must be direct. 4 It 
is unclear whether the intel'vention of natural forces such 
16 
as wind, tide, waves, rain, render an invasion consequential 
rather than direct. Discharge of oil from a ship which 
was subsequently carried by wave action to the plaintiff's 
. foreshore has been held not to constitute trespass because 
the invasion was consequential. 5 This contrasts with an 
earlier trespass decision in which it was held that it 
was trespass to allow faecal matter under the defendant's 
control to escape into a river so that it was carried to 
the plaintiff's land, whether by the current or wind. 6 
If the approach taken in the oil discharge case were to 
prevail, it would pose a major stumbling block for develop-
\. ment of trespass as a means to control pollution. The 
argument that the influence of natural forces prevents 
actionable trespass has not found favour with most courts 
in the United States. For example, in Martin v. Reynolds 
~~-------=--7 the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected the 
defendant's claim that the settling of fluoride deposits 
on the plaintiff's land constituted only a consequential 
as opposed to a direct invasion of property. So long 
as this issue does not restrict the use of trespass, the 
action is characterised by several features which may 
make it more attractive than alternative actions. If the 
action is brought in nuisance, it is relevant to consider 
whether the invasion of interest was unreasonable in the 
circumstances. In trespass it is no defense that the 
defendant's conduct was reasonable. Furthermore, it is 
no defense that the plantiff's use of land is abnormally 
sensitive. (Flemi.ng, 1983) Thus, in trespass the 
17 
plaiH tiff faces a 81 igh tl y lesser burden of proof. The 
burden of proof is also eased by the fact that for 
intentional tr s at least, actual damage need not 
be proved. It is sufficient to prove the act of trespass. 
However, this advantage is perhaps more theoretical than 
real. Unless actual damage is proved only nominal 
damages will be awarded, which is unlikely to have much 
deterrent value. Where ,the plaintiff seeks an injunction 
rather than an award of damages, undoubtedly absence of 
proof of actual damage will not incline the court in his 
favour when the object of the injunction is to prevent a 
, 1 . 8 factory pol utlng. 
(ii) Nuisance 
Nuisance, like trespass, protects interests in 
land. While trespass is concerned to protect the interest 
in exclusive possession of land, nuisance is concerned 
with balancing interests in the enjoyment and use of ' land. 
Unlike trespass, it is not confined to direct invasions 
of land, which makes it potentially applicable to a much 
wider range of environmental problems. These include 
pollution in all its forms 9 - gases, particulates, noise, 
smell, solid waste, problems of flooding, subsidence and 
erosion, fire, noxious weed encroachment, protection of 
views, indeed, almost any adverse environmental impact 
over which adjoining property owners might come into 
conflict. There is some debate whether it is necessary 
to a cause of action in nuisance that the nuisance emanate 
from land of the defendant. The view favoured in 
13 
New Zealand is that it need not. The action is 
available, it would seem, if the defendant misuses 
someone else's land, or public land, or even th~ plaintiff's 
10 
own land. The interference complained of need not 
. necessarily have been created by the defendant. A land-
owner may become liable for a state of affairs which he 
has added to, or which he has or ought to have become 
aware of, and did nothing about. 11 It is sometimes 
said/that nuisance does not apply where there is an 
isolated event rather than interference of a continuing 
nature. However, New Zealand courts do not adhere 
strictly to this rule,12 which if enforced, would restrict 
the potential of the action. 
/ The mere fact of interference is not a sufficient 
ground to succeed in a nuisance action. The courts must 
be satisfied that the interference is both substantial 
and unreasonable in the sense that the plaintiff should 
not b~ required to suffer it. The defendant may be 
operating his factory with care, but it still may be 
adjudged unreasonable after taking into account the balance 
of interests. In performing the balancing exercise, the 
courts take into account such matters as the purpose of 
the defend t's conduct, its suitability to the locality, 
its value to the co~nunity, the duration of the interference 
and the practicality of avoiding the interference; the 
extent and character of the harm to the plaintiff, the 
value of the use inter red 'with, its suitability to its 
locali ty, . and whet.ller tbe plain ti f f could have avoided til e 
harm. Once the plaintiff proves an interference caused 
19 
by the defendant, the burden of satisfying the court 
that the interference was reasonable shifts to the 
defendant. (Fleming, 1983) Although the action is 
concerned to protect interests in land, the damages 
recoverable are not limited to land, but also cover injury 
to chattels and loss of commercial profit. 13 However, 
the liability of the defendant is limited to harm that was 
a foreseeable consequence of the nuisance. Where there 
is actual physical damage to land or chattels theron, 
the courts;seemmore ready to infer that the interference 
is unreasonable, without regard to the locality or the 
utility of the defendant's conduct. Indeed, the 
New Zealand position seems to be that where there is 
material injury to property not only do utility and 
locality become irrelevant, but so also does foreseea-
bility. The nuisance will be actionab so long as 
the damage "represents the consummation of a risk, 
however remote, inherent in the conduct of the defendant " .
14 
Factors such as zoning, whether or not the defendant 
is acting in compliance with various statutes such as the 
Clean Air Act or the Water and Soil Conservation Act, 
will be relevant to the issue of whether the interference 
. ' bl Itl h t 'I l' 15 1S unreasona e, a "loUg no necessar1 y conC.US1ve. 
Nevertheless, where there has been full compliance with' 
any necessary statutory consents, this is likely to 
weigh heavily witb the court when it decides whether,on 
balance,the interference is unreasonable. 
20 
It is unclear to what extent the court would 
consider broad environmental concerns such as ensuring 
sustainable use of renewable resources, preserving 
diversity, or protecting ecological processes, relevant 
to the balancing of interests,. except to the extent 
,:that they directly affect the plaintiff. In a leading 
American case 16 the Court took the view that they were 
irrelevant. However, in considering the utility of the 
defendant1s conduct, the courts frequently take into account 
such matters as the importance of the offensive enterprise 
to the locality in terms of employment. This, too, is 
a matter of public rather than private concern. There 
is surely no justification for treating broad environ-
mental concerns on any different footing from broad 
economic concerns. But there can be little doubt that 
the courts would be entitled to take these broader 
considerations into account in an action for public 
nuisance. This gives the tort of public 
[ 
nuisance a 
significant advantage from a resource management 
perspective. 
(iii) Public Nuisance 
Public nuisance is an act which seriously 
interferes with the health, comfort, or convenience of 
the public generally, or interferes with rights which 
members of the community generally might otherwise 
. 17 
enJoy. The action is a curious hybrid of public and 
private law. Public nuisance is classified as a 
misdemeanour or petty crime. For this reason, before 
21 
, t 'd' °d 1 b' t" t 18 a pr1va e 1n lVl ua can rlng an aC-l0n ln ort 
he must establish not only the nuisance but also that 
he has suffered harm over and above the public at 
19 large. Alternatively, he must obtain the consent 
of the Attorney-General to bring relator proceedings 
(a~'action taken in the name of the Attorney-General) 20 
which removes the need to show special injury. If 
neither situation applies it must be left to the 
Attorney-General to bring action. In practice, this 
seldom occurs. 
Although public nuisance will frequently overlap 
with private nuisance, it is not limited by the require-
mentthat there be an invasion of the plaintiff's 
interest in land. The relevant criterion is invasion 
of a public interest. Hence, unlike private nuisance, 
this action has the potential to be used by concerned 
citizens to protect public lands and waterways or other 
21 
common property resources. This makes it the most 
valuable action from a resource management perspective. 
But in spite of the apparent advantages of the 
public nuisance action, these could remain theoretical 
if the special damage rule is interpreted restrictively 
or the Attorney-General's consent to undertake proceedings 
is sparingly granted. At present, the law is uncertain 
as to what sort of damage will suffice to permit a private 
action. On the strictest view, the dama lliust dif r 
not. only in degree but in kind from the injury suffered 
22 
by the public at large. This is an onerous burden, 
which led to a decision that commercial fishermen 
could not bring an action for loss of their livelihood 
against polluters of public waters because their 
injury did not differ in kind from that of the neral 
public, although it was significantly greater. 22 Not 
all courts have adopted such a restrictive approach. 
The modern tendency is to adopt a more liberal approach, 
iwhich allows a private action so long as the plaintiff's 
hardship is appreciably more substantial, more direct, 
or more proximate. (Fleming, 1983). Personal injury 
or pecuniary loss will usually amount to particula~ 
damage. In a line of American decisions, the courts 
relied on proximity of the plaintiffs to the location 
of the nuisance as sufficient to distinguish their injury 
f 1 23 rom otlers. Even this more liberal approach, 
although helpful, will not greatly extend the situations 
when suit can be brought by private citizehs to prevent 
various forms of environmental degradation. Public 
nuisance will not be widely useful at the instance of 
members of the public un s recreational interests or 
what may for convenience be termed 'ideological,24 
interests, are recognised as giving a greater interest 
than the public at large. The very fact that public 
nuisance is treated as a crime may also re~trict the approach 
potential of this action. The cqurts may hesitate to fix 
the label of a crime to an action, notwithstanding that it 
interferes witl] the interests of a large section of the 
public. This difficulty is likely to be felt most 
23 
strongly in the area of protecting aesthetic values. 
The potential problems are well illustrated by a leading 
Australian case in which the court declined to treat a 
proposal to build a tower in a public par~ which would 
, 
have an adverse impact upon a prominent skyline vie~ as 
a public nuisance. 25 'fhe presiding Judge stated 'I i t 
is the existence of conflicting points of view which 
points up the difficulty of treating a dramatic change 
in the landscape which shocks those of one point of view, 
but does not shock but even attracts others, as a fit 
subject for public nuisance .... it is going much too far 
to suggest that it might be a crime to construct a 
building which offends even a large majority of citizens 
in some locality by reason that it is considered to break 
a skyline .... " 
(iv) Negligence 
Negligence frequently overlaps with the actions 
already described. However, unlike those actions, which 
focus on the impact of the defendant's activity on the 
interest of the plaintiff, negligence focuses attention 
on the conduct of the defendant. It is conduct falling 
below a standard demanded for the protection of others 
against unreasonable risk of harm. It is judged against 
the impersonal stand~rd of how a reasonable man would have 
acted in the circumstances. Factors the courts take 
into account in determining whether the reqOired standard 
of care has been met include the likelihood of harm, the 
magnitude of the risk, the risk of serious injury, the 
utili ty of the defendants act, the burden of elim:lna ting 
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risk, whether or not the defendant's conduct conforms 
to standard practices, and whether or not it is in 
compliance with any appropriate standard of conduct 
prescribed by legislation. (Fleming, 1983; Street, 
1983) The fact that conduct conforms to common practice 
does not necessarily avoid liability if common practice 
is not in accord with what ought to be done. For example, 
a court might well find that a proper regard for environ-
mental safety would require adoption of abatement technology 
that is not in common use, or adequate research into the 
safety of a product before its release onto the market. 
Because negligence is not defined in terms of 
either a particular type of harm or a particular type of 
interest invaded, it is a tort of very wide ranging 
applicationi the boundaries of which are being extended 
steadily. However, if the scope of the action were 
allowed to be extended indiscriminately, it would become 
an undue fetter on freedom of action. Hence the courts 
must strive to strike a balance between the protection 
afforded by the action and freedom of action. They do 
this principally through the concept of a duty of care. 
Behaviour which the man in the street would label as 
negligent will Dot necessarily entail liability. 
Liability only arises in a situation where the courts 
hold that there is a duty in the circumstances to observe 
care. Their approach to the creation of new duties 
consists of asking first whether there is a sufficient 
relationship of proximjty between the plaintiff and the 
defendant that the latter must have reasonably foreseen 
25 
that carelessness on his part would be likely to cause 
d~mage to the plaintiff. If this test is satisfied, 
they will consider whether there are any policy consider-
at ions for not recognising a duty, or for limiting its 
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scope. The plaintiff, having established that the 
defendant owed him a duty of care which he has breached 
by failing to attain the required standard of care, must, 
in addition,be able to show that breach of the duty 
caused him harm which was reasonably foreseeable. In 
general it can be said that the plaintiff in negligence 
faces a more difficult burden of proof than plaintiffs 
in the actions considered so far. 
Thus far in the development of negligence the 
courts have tended to restrict liability to situations 
in which injury occurs to the person or to physical property. 
They have even resisted allowing liability for economic 
loss unless it is consequential upon injury to person or 
property, al though recently some inroads have been made 
. 1 ' . ' 27 T1 d t h .. t In t11s area. Je nee 0 s ow InJury "0 person or 
property means that for the purposes of resource manage-
ment, negligence has a narrower range of potential 
I ' t' t1 t" bl' . 28 app lca Ions Jan an ac "lOn In pu lC nUlsance. For 
example, those whose recreational or commercial interests 
have been affected by toxic discharges from a factory, but 
have suffered no harm to person or property, would have no 
claim in negligence, but might well have an action in 
public nuisance. Furthermore, in negligence actual 
physical injury must be sustained. Mere interference 
with personal comfort or enjoyment of property cannot give 
26 
grounds for an action as it does in nuisance. 
(v) Breach of Statutory 'duty 
The action for breach of statutory duty cannot be 
. 
disregarded as a possible basis for actions concerned with 
environmental issues, although by the very nature of the 
action it is not possible to say much about the situations 
in which it might apply. Both the interests protected 
and the conduct giving rise to a cause of action will 
depend on the statute concerned. In order to succeed 
the plaintiff must first of all persuade the court that 
the Act intended to confer a right of action in tort and 
that he is one of the persons protected by the statute. 
He must then establish that the defendant was in breach of 
a mandatory duty29 imposed upon him which caused the 
plaintiff harm within the scope of the general class of 
risks at which the statute is directed. 30 Parliament 
seldom indicates whether a private action in tort was 
intended. It is therefore a matter f6r interpretation 
by the courts, although inevitably there is a degree of 
artificiality about this 1 because if a right of action had 
been intended, the Act would almost certainly say so. 
CI~arly, policy considerations playa large part in 
whether an action will be allowed. However, in general 
it can be said that it is easier to prove the Act creat 
a private right where the duty is imposed for the benefit 
of an ascertainable class and where no alternative remedy 
for breach of the duty is provided. 31 Furthermore, the 
courts will not readily allow an action in tort where public 
bod have breached genera] statutory duties. (Street, 198~3 
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(vi) The- rule in Rylands v Fletcher 
The rule in Rylands v Fletcher applies to much 
more specific situations than the actions previously 
discussed. It applies to interference with the land of 
32 
another caused by the escape of something accumulated 
on the land of th~ defendant, in the course of non-natural 
use of his land, which is likely to cause harm if it 
escapes. Although nuisance, negligence, and trespass 
may be alternative causes of action, the rule in Rylands 
v Fletcher sometimes applies where the others cannot 
succeed. If the plaintiff successfully establishes all 
the elements of the cause of action the defendant will be 
liable regardless of whether he was negligent in allowing 
the escape or whether the circumstances of the escape 
were foreseeable, except where he can show the escape was 
caused by an unprecedented natural act ("act of God") or 
by the deliberate act of a stranger which could not 
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arise in negligence, trespass or nuisance for unforeseeable 
harm resulting from escape of the accumulated object (save 
in the case of the exception noted above to the general 
requirement of fore~eeability in nuisance). A landowner's 
liability for the actions of independent contractors, 
lawful visitors, servants and agents is also more extensive 
than it is under the other torts. 34 
Whether or not a use of land is held to be non-
n~tural is critical to the outcome of an action under the 
rule. It is usually defined as "some special use bringing 
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with it increased danger to others, not merely ordinary 
use of land or such use as is proper for the general 
benefit of the community,,35. However, this gives little 
indication of the situations in which the rule will 
apply. The definition is sufficiently flexible to 
allow the courts to adjust to changing patterns of 
social and economic need. In New Zealand it has been 
36 held to cover scrub burn-offs ,roadside spraying with 
weedkiller3~ altering the natural contour of the land 
to create an artificial accumulation of soi138 and 
•• ..,' ~ ~ "", , .... -o:! 
diversion of water from its natural watershed to another. 39 
Elsewhere, aerial spraying of weedkiller, slag hea~s, 
phosphate slime reservo , and bulk storage of water, 
gas, oil, even electricity, have been held non-natural 
uses for the purposes of the rule. Approval of a 
particular use by a planni authority does not automatically 
make it 'natural'. (Flem , 1983) Nor is it necessary 
that the thing 'accumulated' be inherently dangerous. 
In spite of the very specific requirements of . 
the rule, the examples cited above indicate that it 
is applicable to a number of important environmental 
problems. However, the courts have tended on the whole 
to be conservative in extending the rule to new situations. 
Although the potential of these actions for dealing 
with various environmental problems is undoubtedly much 
greater than the limited number of New Zealand cases would 
suggest, the very fact that they are private law remedies 
entails certain inherent disadvantages from a resource 
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management perspective, in addition to any disadvantages 
generally inherent in litigation as a form bf problem 
solving, which is to be the subject of discussion in 
Chapter Four. 
We have seen,that with the exception of public 
nuisance, the court is concerned with the issue of 
whether the actions of the defendant have caused injury 
to private rights of the plaintiff. Whether or not his 
actions also cause injury to the environment is peri-
pheral to the courts' central inquiry. In some situations 
the injury to the plaintiff's interest will coincide 
closely with the injury to the environment, as, for 
example, where toxic emissions from a factory or leaching 
of toxic wastes from a hazardous wastes disposal site, 
impair or destroy the biological productivity of the 
plaintiff's land. Very often the wider environmental 
harm is incidental to the injury sustained by the plaintiff 
which gives rise to a cause of action. A typical, if 
rather mundane example of this category of injury, is 
the case6f air pollution from an adjoining factory which 
interferes with the plaintiff's enjoyment of his land 
by damaging paintwork on his buildings, preventing 
washing from being hung outside and generally making 
outdoor activities unpleasant. The action must stand 
or fallon the merits of this particular injury to this 
particular plaintiff, not on the basis that it is 
contributing to the cumulative problem of air pollution. 
Indeed, as has been noted previously, there is some doubt 
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concerning the extent to which it is relevant at all 
to take into account the wider en~ironmental problem 
of which the particular "injury in question is but a part. 40 
Courts will differ in their attitudes on this point. 
Likewise~ they will differ in the extent to which they 
will take account of the wider socio-economic issues 
which also ought to be part of sound resource management 
decision-making. The selective basis on which the 
courts process information makes litigation a crude tool 
for striking the best balance between development of 
resources and protection of the environment. It is a 
very indirect means of dealing with widespread environ-
ment~l problems, although it may resolve or ameliorate 
a particular problem in a particular place. 
A further consequence of the central emphasis on 
injury to private interest is that the actions outlined 
are not useful for dealing with the problems of longterm 
harm to the environment, where injury is caused to future 
rather than present generations, or where tbe immediate 
injury to individuals is insufficient to give grounds 
. for litigation. Unless the courts modify th~ special 
injury requirement for public nuisance, even that action 
would be unavailable at the suit of private individuals 
. tl' t f' t " t' 41 ln 11S ype 0 Slua lon. 
Issues of resource scarcity will frequently fall 
into the category of causing barm to future rather than 
present generations. Hence the law of torts is in 
general less able to deal with scarcity issues than those 
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of envir.onmental degradation. Clearly there are 
exceptions. The threat of scarcity may be imminent. 
Yet even then, this of itself does not fit any of the 
interests protected by these actions. 42 The issue of 
resource scarcity may be approached indirectly where 
.this issue merges with problems of environmental 
degradation. For example, where environmental degra-
dation poses a present threat to the sustainability of 
renewable resources, or where wasteful, inefficient use 
of resources creates pollution problems. 
~lthough interference with property is one of the 
private interests protected by the law of torts, substantial 
damage may be caused to a plaintiff's land and the 
ecological communities living on it without necessarily 
constituting injury to land for the purposes of legal 
action. The anthropocentric nature of what is meant by 
injury is graphically illustrated in a recent New Zealand 
d .. 43 eC1S10n. The case concerned a fire which had 
escaped from neighbouring property onto the land of 
Forest Products, where it had burnt scrub and bracken 
but not any of the plantation timber. The issue for 
the Court to decide was whether in a Rylands v Fletcher 
action the plaintiff could recover costs incurred in 
firefighting. It found that there had been no injury to 
land. However, because interference with use of land fell 
within the rule Rnd the need to firefight was such an inter-
ference, recovery of the cost of doing so was allowed. 
One of the most serious limitations arising 
. I, ' 
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from the fact that these are private remedies designed 
~o compensate for injury to private interests is perhaps 
self-evident. A right'of action can only accrue once 
injury has been sustained. Apart from certain limited 
exceptions threat of injury does not suffice to give a 
cause of action. Clearly, action taken after the event 
is far from an optimum means of problem solving and is 
~the antithesis of the desired resource management goal 
of anticipatory planning. Thus, where the harm is 
irreversible the law of torts can at best act as a 
deterrent. Its effectiveness as a deterrent against 
repetition of similar harm by the d endant will depend 
on the severity of the damages awarded against him. 
This is the principal remedy of torts. The basic aim 
of damages is to restore the plaintiff to his previous 
position subject to the rules concerning foreseeability 
of damage which were noted above. Clearly, if the 
court is concerned to restore the plaintiff to his 
previous position the damages awarded will not necessarily 
result in the best allocation of resources. In economic 
terms the amount of damages may not reflect social willing-
ness to pay for the offending activity. The effectiveness 
of the law of torts as a deterrent against similar acts 
by others will depefid first and foremost upon the risk 
of being subjected to legal action, as well as the 
severity of the possible damages award. Where there 
is a high risk of legal proceedings one wou].d expect 
. potential defendants either to spend up to the anticipated 
cost of damages to prevent llarm or to take out liability 
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insurance. In either case this should cause a shift in 
consumer demand through cost internalisation (provided 
that consumer demand for the product or service is elastic). 
(Thompson, 1973) If the law acts as a poor deterrent 
because risk of legal proceedings is low,not only will it 
be inequitable between those in similar situations but it 
may also distort efficient resource allocation. Assuming 
that the defendant is able to pass on the costs of the 
legal action through the pricing system, the effect of a 
completely random selection of defendants is that similarly 
harmful or more harmful behaviour by others may gaiti a 
market advantage. 
In the case of reversible harm torts actions can 
playa more positive role by stopping the cause of the 
harm. This may be achieved either by an award of damages 
or by grant of an injunction. In order to put an end to 
the harm, damages must of course be sufficient to cause 
the defendant to alter his behaviour. An inadequate 
award of damages may simply have the effect of licensing 
the harmful activity. From the point of view of preventing 
continuation of the harm the injunction is a more useful 
remedy. 
An injunction is an order of the court requiring 
the defendant to do or refrain from doing a particular 
thing. Where the defendant is restrained from committing 
o~ repeating a tortious act the ~njunction is termed 
prohibitory. This is the usual form of injunction and 
is frequently used to prevent a nuisance or a trespass. 
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An injunction may also take the form of requiring a 
positive act to put an end to the tort, for example, 
an order to install pollution control equipment. This 
is termed a mandatory injunction. It can be argued 
that this form of injunction is less desirable in the 
interests of wise resource use than an order which 
simply requires an end to the harmful activity but leaves 
it to the defendant to find the means of doing so. It 
is perhaps for the best then that mandatory injunctions 
are sparingly granted. 44 Indeed, there are practical 
limitations as to the types of act that the courts can 
compell. They are not equipped to provide continuing 
supervision to ensure that an order is complied with,so 
where this would be necessary a mandatory injunction is 
unlikely to be granted. 45 
An injunction may be applied for once litigation 
has c6mmenced but before it has proceeded to a hearing. 
This is known as an interim or interlocutory injunction. 
This is obviously an important advantage where proceedings 
are likely to be protracted or delayed. In theory the 
injunction will either be confirmed or revoked when the 
cause of action is tried, but in practice, the grant of 
such an injunction usually results in settlement between 
the parties so that the matter never proceeds to trial. 
If this happens the plaintiff will benefit from not facing 
the full burden of proving his case. Where the injunction 
he seeks is prohibitory he need only satisfy the court 
that there is a serious question to be tried and that 
damages would not be an adequate remedy. Having satisfied 
35 
this test, the court will decide whether or not to 
grant an injunction on the basis of the balance of 
hardship between the parties. If the plaintiff 
succeeds in obtaining an injunction, it may in effect 
be granted in a case where he would not be successful 
in establishing all the elements of the cause of action 
~t full trial. 46 In the case of mandatory injunctions 
the plaintiff has the more substantial task of establishing 
a prima facie case, that is, .he must go some way towards 
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Although injunctions will not be granted where 
damages would be adequate compensation, it is relatively 
easy to show they would not where damages canlt easily 
be quantified or where the wrongful activity is of a 
continuing nature, or is likely to be repeated. This, 
of course, will frequently be the case with environmental 
harm. However, injunctions have been held not to be 
available in negligence actions, even though the wrongful 
~ctivity is of a continuing sort which would be eligible 
for an injunction if tried in nuisance, trespass or 
48 ~lands v Fletcl1er. 
this cause of action. 
This reduces the usefulness of 
The courts are not influenced in their decision 
Whether or not to gr~nt an injunction by considerations 
such as the greater economic or social value of the 
offending activity. If damages would not be an adequate 
l'crncdy the courts may grant an injunction al though it is 
against the pu~lic interest to restrain the activity 
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concerned. Indeed,injunctions have been granted when 
it would have been cheaper for the plaintiff to prevent 
the harm. Having excluded wider public interest issues 
from consideration in deciding whether the plaintiff 
should succeed, one might expect such issues would be 
considered relevant in deciding what form of remedy 
should be granted. 49 Apart from the traditionally high 
regard for private property right~ in the common law, 
the policy behind this attitude seems to be based on the 
belief that to provide otherwise could in effect force 
the plaintiff to sellout to the wrongdoer or put up with 
50 the harm on the defendant's terms. To the extent that 
environmental concerns would in all probability be subor-
dinated to economic considerations if the public interest 
were taken into account, undoubtedly-this attitude is often 
advantageous to the environmental plaintiff. But overall, 
exclu~ion of the public interest cannot serve the interests 
of sound decision-making. It is perhaps partly recognition 
that the adversary format of torts proceeding cannot produce 
a fine enough balance between public and private interests 
that leads the courts to exclude public interest altogether. 
But this yet again illustrates that torts proceedings are 
not, an ideal tool for striking the best balance between 
protecting the environment and the legitimate needs of 
resource users. 
The one exception to the normal situation that no 
right of action can accrue unless injury has been sustained, 
lies in the courts' power to issue quia timet injunctions. 
Tbis form of injunction may be issued to restrain a threatened 
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tort. In spite of t~e obvious'application of this 
sort ot injunction to environmental. problems, it is 
important not to exaggerate its potential. The courts 
are sparing in their use of them. 51 There must be a 
strong probability that what the defendant is intending 
to do will in fact take place and will cause substantial 
injury if it does. The degree of probability required 
will depend upon the circumstances but in particular the 
gravity of the possible injury and the balance of hardship 
between the parties. If the damage would be irreparable 
there is a greater likelihood of an injunction being 
granted but clearly if something other than an injunction 
could avoid the threatened damage the courts would not 
issue one. Hence the imminence of the threat will be an 
important consideration. A major practical difficulty 
in the way of obtaining a t injunction will be 
proving that injury will be caused. Even though the 
possibility of obtaining this sort of injunction is 
preferable to a remedy after damage has occurred, it is 
clearly no substitute for anticipatory planning. 
Proof of causation is a difficulty shared by all 
torts actions, not just an application for quia timet 
injunctions. It is essential to the logic of the law 
of torts that the defendant must have caused the injury 
complained of. In the interests of fairness he should 
not be liable for harm he has not caused (or will not 
cause) . The usual test of causation is known as the 
"but-for test", The plaintiff must be able to show that 
the harm would not have occurred but for the defendant's 
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act. Two sorts of difficulty typically arise in the 
~nvironmental context: problems of linking the harm to 
the challenged activity because of scientific uncertainty 
about causation, and problems of linking the harm to the 
defendant because of multiple causation. Both sorts of 
difficulty may be encountered in one action. Even when 
'there is a single identifiable defendant and no doubt 
that his activity causes the type of harm alleged by the 
plaintiff, actual proof of cause may involve considerable 
expense, requiring expert witnesses and use of complex 
~technology such as radio-isotope tracing or remote 
sensing. 52 This will not always be so, of course. 
In some cases evidence of visual observation may be 
:~ufficient, or something as relatively straightforward 
as ambient air test or water samples. 
Scientific disagreement about the nature and 
extent of the harm caused by various pollutants or 
:6hemical toxicants places a serious obstacle in the way 
of greater use of the law of torts to deal with many of 
. the serious problems of environmental degradation and 
'threat to basic life support systems. It is self-evident 
that with many environmental problems action must be 
taken on the basis of risk rather than certainty because 
, if harm does result it will be irreversible. In any 
particular case the degree of probability of harm 
occurring needs to be balanced against the severity of 
the possible injury. A legislator is freer to act on 
a lower degree of probability than is proper for a 
judge. Legislation will apply to all those who carry 
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out the potentially harmful activity. The judge, faced 
with a guia timet application, has to decide whether an 
individual defendant should be stopped from carrying out 
an activity he is otherwise lawfully engaged in. This, 
in fairn,ess, must demand a high degree of probability, 
which is not to say that a plaintiff should be denied 
a remedy against the potential harm simply because the 
legislators have not seen fit to control the risk. The 
point is that judges and legislators are faced with quite 
different balances of interest. 
Although there is general scientific agreement 
about the harm caused by an activity courts may be 
reluctant to trust the evidence of new and relatively 
untried scientific methodologies. Even longstanding 
methodologies such as statistics may, depending on the 
circumstances, be considered an insufficient basis for 
, , I 1 I' b'l't 53 lmposang .ega la 1 1 y. On the other hand, because 
the requisite legal standard of proof is the balance of 
probabilit~ the courts may find that legal cause has been 
established where scientists would not be prepared to 
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Multiple causation problems ar e whenever the 
injury to the plaintiff is the result of a combination of 
causes or where it could have been caused by anyone of a 
number of defendants. This sort of situation commonly 
arises in litigation over pollution, especially in an urban 
context where there will be numerous sources, many of which 
may act synergistically. In those circumstances the "/Jut for II 
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test will be very difficult to apply. But the law does 
not leave a plaintiff entirely remediless. In what may 
be described as the "contribution-to-aggregate-condition 
. 
test ll , several defendants who, for example, pollute a 
stream may be held sepa'rately liable even though the 
contribution of each alone would not cause substantial 
55 harm. Each defendant will be held liable for all the 
harm though, of course, the plaintiff can only recover 
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one lot of damages. The situation is a little 
different when natural conditions contribute to the 
aggregate cause, as for example, where emissions from 
a geothermal power plant combine with natural geothermal 
emissions to cause harm. On normal rules the defendant 
should only be liable for harm caused by the amount he 
contributed unless it was foreseeable that the addition 
of his emissions would result in harm where ther~ had 
been none before. If there is no base line data available 
for gauging the natural contribution it will be very 
difficult to determine the appropriate extent of the 
defendant's liability,57 
Where injury could have been caused by one of a 
number of defendants the plaintiff faces greater difficul-
ties. He can join all the possible defendants and hope 
that by attempting to eXCUlpate themselves they will 
assist him to prove which caused the injury. American 
and Canadian courts have developed certain burden of proof-
shifting rules which may assist the plaintiff under some 
circumstances. In negligence suits, where the plaintiff 
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is able to prove two or mure persons acted negligently 
and the injury was caused by one of them, each defendant 
will be held liable unless he proves he did not cause 
the injury.58 A variant on this rule has been developed 
in relation to neglige~ce suits for dangerous products • 
. The market share liability theory imposes liability on 
all producers of a product from an identical design or 
formula to the extent of their share of the market 
unless a defendant can exonerate himself. This rule 
could be extended to situations where the activities of 
a group of defendants result in substantially the same 
discharges and the plaintiff is unable tQ trace the 
actual source of those eventually deposited on his land. 
Although the plaintiff must still prove his injury was 
caused by the emissions, in effect, under this rule he 
would no longer have to prove the defendant caused the 
harm. 
Notwithstanding the potential usefulness of these 
various rules in environmental litigation, there are 
limits to the assistance which can be derived from them. 
Their value decreases as the number of contributing 
causes or possible defendants increase. If pursued 
too far they would quickly bring the courts into the 
borderline area between lawmaking which is a valid 
exercise of judicial creativity and that which encroaches 
on the legislators role. 
Discussioti of the contribution the law of torts 
can make to dealing with resource management problems 
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would not be complete without a brief consideration 6f 
the effect of statutes on these remedies. Legislation 
now provides statutory procedures f6r dealing with many 
Je~ource managemen~ problems. There is a presumption 
of statutory interpretation that statutes are not intended 
to abolish common law remedies unless there is a statement 
of specific intent or unless they do so by necessary 
implication. None of the major pieces of environmental 
legislation expressly exclude the common law remedies, 
but they inevitably affect them. Evidence of non-
compliance with the conditions of a water right or a 
. licence under the Clean Air Act, for example, will 
provide strong sup~ort for a plaintiff who claims a 
nuisance exists, and may assist him to establish that 
there has been breach of a duty of care. On the other 
hand evidence of compliance may provide a defense for the 
defendant. Possession of a water right has been held 
no defense to a defendant who causes damage to the 
( 
property of another in the exercise of his right by, 
for example, negligently diverting a stream in such a 
way as to cause flooding to neighbouring land. 59 But 
/ 
where effluent disposal complies with the conditions of 
a water right granted in a valid exercise of statutory 
power, undoubtedly the courts would not impose liability. 
By effectively setting a higher standard than that imposed 
by the statutory authority, they would be taking upon 
themsleves a decision-making power which Parliament has 
vested in another body.60 
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Where a statute does not expressly exclude common 
law remedies, a defendant who is acting pursuant to 
statutory authority will nevertheless be sheltered 
from liability if he can prove that commission of the 
tort was an inevitabl~ consequence of carrying out the 
authorised act. He will be able to do this if he can 
show that he used all reasonable skill and care in 
carrying out the activity, in the light of contemporary 
scientific knowledge. Thus the operators of a coal-fired 
power plant in Britain were unable to excuse themselves 
from a claim in nuisance by arguing that sulphur 
emissions are an inevitable consequence of operating 
suchplants. 61 The court was of the opinion that they 
had shown Il call ou s indifference in planning the construc-
tion of the station to all but its own efficiencyll. 
They could have done a great deal more to find out how 
t . t . t th .. 12 o m1 ,1ga e . e em1SS10ns. However, where a statute 
vests a body with a power to execute a variety of works 
of a specified description (such as flood control works) 
as and when it deems necessar~ the defense of statutory 
authority will usually apply. Although the ihjury 
might be avoidable to this particular plaintiff by siting 
the work elsewhere, injury to someone is inevitable if 
the work is to be carried out. If the courts were to 
intervene by granting an injunction they would here again 
be substituting their opinion for that of the authority 
in whom Parliament has vested the power. But a statutory 
authority cannot excuse itself on these grounds if it is 
acting outside its powers, or if the injury results from 
61') 
negligence in carrying out the work. 0 
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Wh~re the injury to a plaintiff arises from a 
failure to provide a service or benefit pursuant to a 
64 
statutory power, the concern of the courts not to 
substitute its opinion for that of the statutory 
authority has a decisive bearing on whether or not a 
remedy will be available. A distinction is drawn 
between planning or policy decisions, which cannot give 
rise to a cause of action and what the courts describe 
as operational decisions. This relates to the manner 
in which a policy, once determined, is carried out . 
. Thus a decision whether or not to provide a sewage 
system is a policy matter. Failure to provide one 
could not give rise to liability for damage caused by 
pollution, but damage caused by an unrepaired leak comes 
within the operational spher~ and could give rise to 
liability. 
The most significant statute which excludes common 
law remedies is the Accident Compensation Act, 1972. 
This abolishes all actions for personal injury, replacing 
them with a statutory compensation scheme. This curtails 
the value of torts actions for dealing with environmental 
problems which cause serious health problems, unless 
actionable property damage also occurs. However, 
Vennell (1975) argues that the Act does not prevent an 
.. d t k' .. t·· 65 InJure par-y see lng an lnJunc .lon. If this is so, 
the most valuable remedy from the environmental standpoint 
remains intact, but the Act still has a major impact upon 
the opportunites for bringing negligence actions. This 
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is perhaps unfortunate. Though the law of torts may 
have had little deterrent effect in the typical road 
accident injury case, a substantial award of damages 
in a case such as the Bhopal gas leak can be a more 
effective deterrent than regulations which mayor may 
not be enforced and are certainly unlikely to provide 
1 t · . bl t d l' 66 pena -les compara e 0 a amages calm. 
In conclusion, it needs reiterating that the law 
of torts cannot substitute for sound planning or for 
regulatory control. Even if the scope of these actions 
were broadened to includff interests which are not at 
present recognised, many of the inherent difficulties 
would remain. But their limitations should not lead 
us to overlook the positive contributions they can make. 
By preventing or ameliorating many local sources of 
environmental harm, which individually may be relatively 
,,/ 
insignificant, they can make an important contribution 
to the problem of gradual attrition of environmental 
quality. They can supplement the enforcement of regu-
lations or deal with problems which are not controlled by 
regulation or fall outside the scope of planning controls. 
Not least of all, a torts action can perform a valuable 
publicity function, providing a catalyst for change, even 
though the action itself might fail. Part of that value 
comes from the language of the law, which may help induce 
attitudinal changes, as Thompson (1983) has observed. 
'Negligence', 'nuisance', and 'trespass' convey a moral 
force which is not matched by terms such as 'cost-
internalisation'. 
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CHAPTER THREE , 
PUBLIC 'LAW ACTIONS 
The actions discussed in the previous chapter were 
principally concerned with preventing or ameliorating 
environmental harm caused by the actions of private 
individuals rather than public authorities,' although 
the latter can also be held liable under those actions. 
However, the defense of statutory authority and the limi 
tations upon imposing liability where planning or policy 
qecisions are involved often preclude actions in tort 
against public authorities. Furthermore, a public authority 
may, of course, act unlawfully without committing a tort. 
Th chapter, therefore,.e~amines the main method available 
to citizens for challenging the acts or decisions of the 
administrative branch through the courts, the procedure, 
of judicial review. 
The importance of the State as both a major owner 
and regulator of resources means that the decisions and 
actions of public authorities frequently have a greater 
impact upon the environment and resource allocation than 
the actions of private individuals. Resource management 
disputes arising between 'citizens and the State typically 
fall into one of three categories: 
') Disputes over management policies for publicly owned 
resources. 
2) Disputes over the expenditure of public money on 
projects which may harm the environment or restrict the 
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freedom of future generationsto choose different patterns 
of resource use. 
3) Disputes concerning the nature or scope of regulatory 
control over actions which affect the environment or the 
allocation of resources (including failure to regulate and 
authorisations of resource development by the private sector). 
Not all such disputes are capable of resolution in 
the judicial arena. We saw in chapter one that our courts 
have no power to review legislation. Hence, where inadequate 
legislation is the underlying cause of the dispute, judicial 
review will be of no assistance, except to the extent that 
there is any scope for creative statutory interpretation. 
For example, where statutory criteria governing the develop-
ment or management of a resource are deficient from a 
resource management perspective, the courts cannot supplement 
those criteria. The best they can do is to interpret the 
existing criteria in the most favourable possible way. 
It should be noted here that a statute may purport 
to exclude the acts or decisions of an administrator from 
review. But because of the importance of the power of 
review to the rule of law, the courts will seldom accept 
, 
even the clearest words as entirely excluding review, not~ 
withstanding the doctrine of parliamentary soverej.gnty.2 
However, they will adhere to a provision that a right of 
review must be exercised within a specified time, as is 
provided in the National Development Act, or that appeal 
rights must first be exhausted, as is provided in the Town 
and Country Planning Act. 
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Judicial review is concerned with ensuring the 
legality of the acts and decisions of administrative 
authorities. It is not concerned with their merits. 
If the courts decide whether the acts or decisions are 
right or wrong, desirable or undesirable, they would be 
substituting their own opinion for that of the authority 
vested with the power (the same reason that leads the courts 
to deny tortious liability under certain circumstances). 
Not only would this breach tbe doctrine of separation of 
powers, but on more pragmatic grounds, if all administrative 
·decisions and actions were open to challenge in the courts, 
the administrative process would soon grind to a halt. 
It will be apparent from this, therefore, that although a 
citizen who seeks to challenge the actions of a public 
authority is almost invariably concerried to attack the merits 
of the act or decision in question, once again the attack 
must be indirect. This, the~ removes from the judicial 
arena all those disputes where no possible question of 
.illegality arises. A statute may, of course, provide a. 
right of appeal, which does allow the courts to reconsider 
t f d ' , "t 't 3 some aspec 0 a eC1Slon on ~ s merl s. Appeal rights 
are entirely dependent on statutory provision and should 
not be confused with judicial review, which is a common 
law right that exists irrespective of any right of appeal. 
The courts can grant relief against the actions of 
an administrative authority where it has gone beyond the 
powers conferred upon it by its enabling statute (or regula-
tion) . This is known as the doctrine of u 4 res . 
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An authority may go beyond its powers by failing to perform 
its duties, by doing something which is not authorised by 
the enabling.statute,.orby misusing or abusing discretionary 
power. 
Failure to perform a statutory duty is probably the 
least important ground of review from a resource management 
perspective because most disputes will revolve around the 
manner in which a discretionary power has been exercised. 
Discretion, of course, implies a power to make a choite 
between alternative actions. Even where an administrative 
authority is under a duty to do certain things, frequently 
it' has a discretion as to the manner of doing so. To take 
a typical example, the Forest Service has a general duty 
to control and manage state forest land in accordance 
with the objectives of the Forests Act, but it has wide 
discretionary power concerning the manner of carrying out 
that duty and what weight to place on the various objectives 
of the Act in any particular case. Conversely, a statute 
may confer a discretionary power to do something but impose 
a duty to observe certain requirements that condition the 
manner in which the discretion may be exercised. For 
example, Regional Water Boards have discretionary power to 
grant or decline applications for local water conservation 
notices, but in doing so, they are under a duty to take 
into account the matters specified in section 20 F (7) 
of the Water and Soil Conservation Act. There will seldom 
be deliberate failure to perform a duty. Usually any cause 
for challenge will arise from misinterpretation of the duty 
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or oversight. Clear cases of failure to perform a duty 
often arise in the context of non-compliance with procedural 
requirements such as a duty to consult with specified 
persons or bodies before reaching a decision or a duty to 
give notice of some matter. 5 
Just as failure to perform a duty frequently arises 
from misinterpretation of the duty, so too, misinterpretation 
of the scope or meaning of a power is the usual cause of 
doing something which is not authorised by the relevant 
enabling statute (i.e. regulation). Thus, the situations 
in which unauthorised acts or decisions may occur are many 
a,nd various. However, the courts will construe a statutory 
power as impliedly authorising whatever may fairly be 
regarded as incidental to or consequential upon the power 
I 
itself. 6 A power to mine coal, for example, must necessarily 
include a power to dispose of overburden and slag. 
A typical example of an unauthorised action arises 
where a statutory authority which is empowered to make 
regulations or by-laws, regulates something it is not entitled 
to because it has misinterpreted the scope of the empowering 
.. 7 provlslons. Another common example is improper delegation 
of, a power or duty. A statutory power or duty must be 
carried out by the authority on which it is conferred, 
unless delegation is authorised. Any such power to delegate 
must, of course, be exercised within any limits prescribed 
b tl . .. 8 Y "le empowerlng prOV1Slon. However, in recognition of 
the realities of administration, a function conferred upon 
a Minister is usually held to be exercisable by his department 
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without an express delegation power, unless it is clear 
that the Minister is required to act personally.9 
Abuse of power may be said to occur when the act 
or decision in issue is of the general type authorised 
by the enabling statute, but in the course of exercising 
its discretion the administrative authority acts in a way 
that the courts imply could not have been intended by the 
legislature. The courts recognise eight main categories 
of abuse, although new categories may be recognised in the 
future. These are acting under dictation, acting on 
predetermined policy rules, agreement not to exercise a 
discretion, acting in bad faith, exercise of the power for 
an improper purpose, acting on irrelevant grounds or 
without regard to relevant grounds, unreasonable exercise 
of power, and insufficiency of evidence. 
i ) Dictation, predetermined policy, agreement not to exercise 
discretion. 
We saw above that a statutory power must be exercised 
by the authority on which it is conferred, unless subdelega-
tion is authorised. Where an authority purports to 
exercise the discretion itself, but acts under the dictation 
of another (who is not authorised to do so), it effectively 
fails to exercise the power. 10 Thus where a Minister 
dismissed a planning appeal on the strength of policy 
objections from another Minister, his decision was invalidated 
because he had, in effect, surrendered his discretion to the 
other Minister. 11 Advice may be sought but it must not be 
followed uncritically. 
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It is quite normal for administrators to adopt 
general rules or policies governing the manner in which a 
discretion will be exercised. This is in the interests 
of efficiency, certainty, and consistency. However, 
consistency must not be pursued at the expense of merit. 
An administrative authority is not entitled to blindly 
follow rules of its own cr~ating. It must be prepared to 
consider the merits of an individual case or listen to a 
substantial argument, reasonably presented, urging a change 
f l ' 12 o P01Cy. The effect of this rule is illustrated by 
t IJ f L d d ., 13 h' h h ld th t 1 1 a recen- louse o· or s eC1Slon, w lC e a a oca 
authority unlawfully exercised its discretion by considering 
itself irrevocably bound by an election promise it had made. 
The Court acknowledged that considerable weight must be 
attached to such a promise but it couldn't validly be 
regarded as a binding fetter on the exercise of the discretion. 
By doing SQ, the authority erred in law. 
The rule that a public authority cannot bargain away 
a discretionary power is another way of saying that it must 
not enter any contract or take any other action which is 
incompatible with fulfilling the primary purposes for 
which it was created. For example, a body which has 
statutory powers and duties in respect to public lands 
cannot disable itself from fulfilling those purposes by 
exercising a subordinate power (such as a power to grant 
concessions in a reserve) in a manner incompatible with 
14 the primary purpose. 
ii)Qad faitht_ improper purposes, relevantandirrelevant 
considerations, unreasonableness, no evidence. 
53 
These categories of abuse often tendto overlap 
although bad faith, which refers to intentional misuse 
of power for extran~ous motives, should be distinguished 
from abuse which arises from ignorance or misunderstanding. 
In practice it is very difficult, indeed, often impossible 
to obtain evidence of improper motive, so this will seldom 
be a fruitful basis for challenging administrative action. 
The courts will intervene if they are satisfied 
that a discretionary power was exercised for a purpose 
that was not contemplated by the enabling statute or 
regulation. 15 Even discretions as broad and sUbjective 
'as a power to make such decisions as an authority thinks 
fit or to impose such conditions as an authority thinks 
fit,. must be exercised in accordance with the purposes 
of the Act of which they are part. Thus, a power 
cannot be exercised to give effect to departmental 
interests or a government policy if those interests or 
the policy are inconsistent with the purposes of the 
enabling statute. 16 Policy cannot override legislation. 
If government policy is inconsistent with the purposes of 
the Act in question the law must be amended in order to 
give effect to the policy. 
aspect of the rule of law. 
This is a fundamental 
The examples given above fall just as readily into 
the category of exercise of discretionary power on 
irrelevant grounds. Here- again statutory interpretation 
looms large. Where a statute specifies relevant factors 
the courts must determine whether they are malldatory and 
whether they are exhaustive. Where the powers are given 
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in the sort of broad terms illustrated above the courts 
must dete~mine whether there are any implicit restrictions 
on the considerations that can properly be taken into 
account and equally, whether there are considerations 
that must be taken into account in spite of the apparently 
unlimited discretionary power conferred. 
To say that the exercise of discretion was unreason-
able may just be another way of saying that it was exercised 
on irrelevant grounds, for a wrong purpose, or for a wrong 
motive. Often this will be the case. Irrelevancy in 
particula~ will often be so closely intertwined with 
unreasonableness as to be indistinguishable. As De 
Smith (1973a, p.305) notes: "Unreasonable acts and decisions 
usually take place because an authority has deviated from 
the path of relevancy in coming to its decision". 
Even though all relevant matters are taken into account 
and no irrelevant matters are allowed to influence the 
decision, nevertheless an authority may act unreasonably 
through giving undue weight to one particular factor. 
A statute may prescribe reasonable conduc~ but 
even where there is no express statutory duty to act 
reasonably the courts will imply a requirement to act 
reasonably on the basis that Parliament could ~ot intend 
to authorise unreasonable exercise of power. Clearly, 
review on this basis could very easily become review on 
the merits. The courts are well aware of the thin line 
they tread between review and what amounts to substitution 
of their own opinion. Hence, they will not lightly 
invalidate a decision on the ground of unreasonableness 
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unless it meets the fatrly stringent test of "being so 
unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever 
have come to it". 17 But courts will differ widely as 
to whether this test is satisfied. Caldwell (1980 a) 
observes that since the rule was first laid down, the 
cases have not tended to be so rigorous in their require-
ment. The courts will have little hesitation about 
finding a decision which is manifestly absurd, arbitrary, 
.. t b ' bl 18 or caprlclous 0 e unreasona e. 
The courts will also intervene where an administra-
tive authority has acted on no evidence, or has reached a 
conclusion to which it could not reasonably come on the 
basis of the evidence before it. 19 In doing so they may 
once again appear to come very close to deciding the merits 
of the decision. The recommendation of the Planning 
Tribunal concerning a water right for the Motunui Synthetic 
Petroleum Plant was recently the subject of an unsuccessful 
review on this basis. 20 The Tribunal granted the water 
right with the proviso that the point of discharge be 
extended further out to sea. The Court of Appeal found 
that, contrary to the plaintiff's allegation, there was 
adequate evidence to justify this decision. However, it 
indicated that there might have been force in the plaintiff's 
claim if the Tribunal had found that the proposed point of 
discharge was unsafe, as there was little specific evidence 
to show that an extension would make an unsafe point of 
discharge safe. If this had been an appeal the court 
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could have reached its own conclusions about the safeness 
of the point of discharge, rather than being confined to 
a consideration of whether there was sufficient evidence 
to support the Tribunal's decision. 
One type of statutory power requires special 
mention. This is the power to make subordinate or 
delegated legislation. The courts power to review 
such legislation is of considerable importance, given 
its vast volume, the fact that it is seldom subject to 
parliamentary scrutiny, and the fact that it may come 
into force with little or no publicity.21 A number of 
environmental statutes contain very important powers to 
make subordinate legislation. District schemes are one 
of the most significant examples ,of subordinate legis-
1 t · f t t' 22 a lon rom a resource managemen perspec lve. In 
general this type of power is subject to the same grounds 
of review as the exercise of other powers. However, 
subordinate legislation may also be challenged on the 
. : 
basis of uncertainty and on the basis that it is in 
conflict with other statutes. 
It is clearly much easier for the courts to 
establish that an administrative authority has acted 
invalidly where powers are worded objectively. Subject-
ively worded powers do not prevent the courts from examining 
~he manner in which they have be~n exercised to ensure that 
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it is within the scope of the power granted, as we have 
seen. But subjective powers make it less easy to 
challenge a decision. The more a power relates to 
policy issues, the more difficult and, indeed, the more 
reluctant the courts are to intervene~3 Review relating 
to resource management issues often confronts this 
difficulty. The problems are well illustrated6y the 
litigation concerning application of the National 
Development Act to the proposed Aramoana development. 
Opponents of the smelter challenged the decision 
24 to apply the Act on two main substantive grounds: 
1) Failure to give due weight to the statutory requirement 
. 25 
tha tit is "essential" a decision be made "promptly". 
2) Failure to take into account relevant considerations 
such as the net economic effect of the proposed work, the 
economic risk, or the affect on New Zealand's energy 
supply. It was claimed that had such matters been taken 
into account no reasonable person could have reached the 
conclusion that the work was Itlikely to be in the national 
interest!! or to be "essential".26 
On the first ground the court concluded, after 
examining a Cabinet paper which analysed the apdlication, 
that there was no evidence to suggest that the strength 
of the word Itessentialll was lost on the Ministers. 
Although not beyond argument, the view that promptness 
was essential in this case was tenable. The Act did 
not require the Governor-General in Council to consider 
whether proceedings under the Act would enable a prompter 
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decision 'than the normal procedure.' 
Challenge on the second ground also failed. The 
court made it clear that a distinction must be drawn between 
considerations which a statute expressly or impliedly 
identifies as having to be taken into account, those that 
must not be taken into account (irrelevant considerations) 
and those which may be taken into account, indeed, which 
many people would have taken into account, but which are 
not mandatory. It stated that where a statute specifies 
a criterion such as the national interest, it is not easy 
to assert the particular considerations that have ,t6 be 
taken into account. It was of the opinion that if the 
facts alleged by the plaintiffs (as to the economic effect 
of the smelter etc. ,) were proven and it was also proven 
that they had not been taken into account, then the Order-
in-council might well have been invalid. In that event 
it would have been hard to see how the Ministers could 
have reasonably regarded the statutory criteria as 
satisfied. However, the court found neither proven. 27 
So long as the view the Ministers formed as to the national 
interest was reasonably open to them, though some might 
disagree, the court could not intervene. Although the 
court was willing to closely scrutinise a decision at the 
very highest level of government to ensure strict compliance 
with the statutory criteria, the large policy element in 
the discretion posed an insurmountable hurdle for the 
plaintiffs. 
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The grounds of review discussed so far have been 
directed at the substance of an administrative act or 
decision (with the exception of non-compliance with 
procedural requirements). The courts have also developed 
grounds of review which are directed at administrative 
procedure. Fairness in decision making is considered to 
:be such an important aspect of the rule of law that the 
courts are prepared to imply that Parliament must have 
intended administr~tors to observe certain minimum standards 
of fair procedure. This sometimes leads them to impose 
further requirements even where Parliament has provjded 
, 
procedural requirements. The required standard will 
vary from case to case according to the nature of the 
function involved, the context in which the power of 
decision is exercised, and the subject matter of the power. 
If the requisite standard is not observed, th6 administrative 
authority is said to have exceeded its powers. The idea 
of substantive fairness is embraced in the concepts of 
unreasonableness and bad faith which were discussed above. 
Traditionally, the minimum standards applied by the 
courts have consisted of two main rules: the rule that 
the decision maker must not be biased and the rule that 
a person affected by a decision has a right to be heard. 
These are known as the principles of natural justice. 
For a long time the courts would only apply the principles 
of natural justice where the decision was adjudicative in 
character,.28 These are now generally recognised to be 
subc~tegories of a wider duty to act fairly, which is not 
dependent upon any classification of function as judicial 
d . . t t' 29 or a mlnlS ra lve. 
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As has already been observed, the content of the 
duty to act fairly is variable. The courts may gb so 
far as to require a judicial type hearing, with opportunities 
for cross-examination, or they may simply require disclosure 
of the opposing case and an opportunity to comment on it. 
Decisions affecting rights in property, personal liberty, 
i"', 
livelihood, status, or reasonable expectations of preserving 
or acquiring benefits such as licences will usually be held 
to require greater procedural protection (if this is not 
already provided by statute). But as always, this must 
·be balanced by the circumstances. As Cooke J. stated 
I 30 . 1 t d . . tt f . 1 recent y Wl t 1 respect '0 eClslons on rna .ers o. na tlona 
interest by the Executive Council: 
It would be very unusual to impose on this body of 
Ministers a duty cif considering, whether directly 
or even in summarised form, the views on matters 
of national interest and the economy of all indiv-
idual property owners affected by a proposal who 
happened to wish to make representations .... It is 
easier to import a duty of administrative irness 
when a decision relates essentially ,to the personal 
circumstances of an individual. 
The courts do not recognise a general duty to give reasons 
for decisions as part of the duty of fairness (although it 
is increasingly common for statutes to provide such a duty). 
One cannot but agree with Whitmore and Aronson (1978) that 
it is perhaps a pity no such general common law rule has 
emerged. As they rightly observe, reasoned decisions are 
~sually better decisions and such a rule would greatly 
assist the courts in, their judicial review. 
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Statutory rules of procedure effectively displace 
the common law duty to act fairly in most major legislation 
concerned with the environment or resource development. 
The courts will not lightly supplement a statutory procedure. 
For exampl~, the Court of Appeal was not prepared to 
supplement the procedural scheme of the National Development 
Act by implying a duty that property owners affected were 
entitled to a hearing before the Order in Council applying 
the Act was made. They would have the normal right of 
objection before the Planning Tribunal. 31 On the other 
hand the court held the decision of a town planning 
committee void because it failed to disclose a report 
from its town planning officer at the hearing - thus the 
parties to the hearing were denied an opportunity to comment 
32 
on the report. 
The rule against bias can be more precisely stated. 
A decision can be set aside on this basis in three situations: 
1) Where th~ decision maker can be shown to have a direct 
pecuniary interest in the subject matter in issue. 
2) Where an observer unacquainted with the facts would 
conclude from the outward form or conduct of the proceedings 
that there was a reasonable suspicion of bias. 
3) ,Where the totality of evidence of the proceeding 
disclose a real likelihood of bias even though on the 
surface they appear to be fairly conducted. 
The question which most frequently arises with resource 
related issues is wheter pre-determination of policy amounts 
to disqualifying bias. This will only be so if the court is 
satisfied that the decision maker had a completely closed 
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mind, which will clearly be very difficult to prove. 
Frequently, statutory provisions implicitly overrule the 
I 
common law rules on bias. 34 It is common for Ministers 
to be given a power of decision over matters in which 
his own policies are likely to be at issue. This is the 
35 
case under the National Development Act, for example. 
A person seeking a remedy for an alleged wrongful 
use of a statutory power or non-compliance with a statutory 
duty must make an application for review in accordance with 
36 S. 9 of the Judicature Amendment Act 1972. This provides 
a statutory procedure in place of the five separate remedies 
which were available at common law - mandamus, prohibition, 
certiorari, injunction, and a declaratory order. These 
common law remedies are complex and it was not uncommon 
for a litigation to lose a meritorious case because he had 
chosen the wrong remedy. The application foi review 
overcomes this difficulty by providing a single procedure. 
But the common law remedies continue to govern the grounds 
on which relief is available and the nature of the relief. 
(Sim and Cain, 1978) In other words the litigant still 
needs to establish that one of the remedies would have been 
granted under the previous law except in the few instances 
where they have been extended by the Act. Hence it is 
necessary to examine them briefly. 
Mandamus is used to compel the performance of a 
public duty, but not all duties will be compellable. 
Some are what the law terms duties of imperfect obligation. 
For example, the National Water and Soil Conservation 
Authority has a general duty to promote the best uses of 
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natural water. But a duty of this type has a large 
discretionary element. Short of the Authority failing to 
act at all, it is difficult to imagine how the courts 
could compel the performance of such a duty without making 
decisions on the merits. Environmental and resource 
statutes contain many examples of this type of duty. 
.. Certiorari and prohibition are complementary 
, 
remedies. Certiorari is used to 'quash' (set aside) an 
order or decision of an authority made without jurisdiction, 
, f' 'd' t' 37 h th d " 1 1n excess 0 Jur1s 1C lon, or were - e eCls10n ma{ers 
record displays an error of law. 38 
At common law this was the sole remedy available 
to set aside a decision, but along with prohibition it 
suffered the defect of applying only where the decision-
maker was said to be under a duty to act judicially. The 
J d ' tAd tAt t d th t t 'd 39 u lca ure men men c- now ex "en s e power 0 se aSl e 
and removes the restriction that orders in the nature ot 
certiorari and prohibition only apply where there is a duty 
to act judicially.40 Certiorari simply sets aside decisions. 
It cannot be used to order the decision-maker to start 
again. This defect is also remedied by the Judicature 
Amendment Act,41 which gives the court the power to order 
the decision-maker to reconsider any specified matters. 
Where no final decision has yet been made prohibition 
applies to prevent an authority from commencing or continuing 
an illegal course of action, which if continued, would give 
rise to grounds for granting certiorari. 
Injunctions have already been discussed in the context 
of pri va te law. They are also available as a public law 
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remedy to ~estrain acts that are ultra vires. The 
declaratory order is a statement or declaration by the 
courts as to the legal rights or duties of a person. 
However, it is simply that. Unlike the previous four 
remedies it cannot be enforced if it is disobeyed. In 
spite of this shortcoming, it is probably the most flexible 
and useful remedy. It is applicable to all the situations 
referred to above but it can also be used where a public 
authority wishes to know the extent of its powers or the 
limits of its duties, where an individual wishes to establish 
the exact scope of a public duty, or to determine the true 
construction of a statute or subordinate leg lation. 
(De Smith, 1973 a) 
The declaration is particularly useful in actions 
against the Crown. 42 Neither mandamus nor an injunction 
are available against the Crown. Even more important~y, 
where. a declaration is sought a court may order interrogatories 
and d covery, which it cannot in the case of the other 
rem~dies.43 An interrogatory is a procedural device by 
which a party may ask the other side questions about any 
matters of material fact relevant to the proceedings (with 
certain exceptions). Discovery is an order requiring a 
party to the proceedings to disclose all documents in his 
possession relevant to the proceedings, unless he can establish 
that they are privileged and therefore exempt from disclosure~4 
Clearly, both devices are potentially very useful means of 
obtaining information which is necessary for success in an 
action, but the courts will not permit them to be used merely 
45 to "fish" for further causes of action. 
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Another possible advantage the declaration offers 
over other remedies (whether in Crown proceedings or not) 
is a relatively liberal standing requirement. Standing, 
or the law governing who is entitled to bring on action to 
cour~ is cif critical importance in determining how useful 
public law actions can be from a resource management 
. . 46 perspectlve. Public interest litigants such as the 
Environmental Defense Society have usually been denied 
47 
standing in the past. The situation is complicated by 
the fact that varying tests for standing apply for each 
remedy and often there is inconsistency of approach even 
~ithin a single remedy. The courts seem to be moving 
towards a much more liberal and consistent approach. If 
the trend continues standing should cease to be a major 
obstacle. However, as the law is in a state of flux at 
present it is necessary to outline briefly the differing 
tests for each remedy. 
Standing for declarations is governed by S 3 of the 
Declaratory Judgments Act 1908 which provides: 
Where any person has done or desires to do any act 
the validity, legality, or effect of which depends 
on the construction or validity of any statute, 
or any regulation ... or any by-law ... or where any 
person claims to have acquired any right under any 
such statute, regulation, by-law ... or to be in any 
other manner interested in the construction or 
validity thereof, such person may apply ... for a 
declaratory order .... 
The Court of APpea1 48 recently considered the meaning of 
the section, rejecting an earlier line of cases which had 
taken a narrow approach, in favour of a line of decisions 
which accepted that the section confers broad standing. 
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However, it declined to express a final opinion as to the 
scope of the section. 
In contrast with the requirement that a party be 
"in any ... manner interested", in order to obtain mandamus 
the applicant is usually required to show that the breach 
duty complained of was owed to him personally or as part of 
a class. Sometimes the requirement is widened to include 
damage to a 'special interest' held by the applicant. 
Although this expression is capable of widely differing 
interpretation, in New Zealand litigants asserting damage 
to their 'special interest' in the environment have been 
denied standing. 49 A similar test applies for injunctions. 
The applicant must either establish that private rights were 
affected or that special damage was suffered over and above 
that suffered by the public at large. The usual test of 
standing for certiorari and prohibition requires the litigant 
to be a person aggrieved, that is, a person with a peculiar 
grievance of his own beyond some grievance suffered by him 
in common with the public. However, the standing rules for 
certiorari and prohibition tend often to be treated more 
liberally. The courts sometimes grant standing to members 
of the public who do not fall within this test. The great 
difficulty confronting the litigant who is concerned with 
protection of environmental quality or wise management and 
use of resources, is that no matter 110W strong and sincere 
his concern might be, the nature of the interest which he 
claims may be affected is not distinct from interests s11ared 
by the public generally. For that reason, the courts have 
been reluctant to include them within tIle categories of 
67 
"special interest", "special damage", or "peculiar grievance". 
The reluctance of the courts to grant standing to those 
who seek to assert the public interest is based on the theory 
that it is the role of the Attorney-General to protect the 
public interest. Members of the public who do not have a 
legally recognised private interest affected must either 
persuade the Attorney-General to bring proceedings or obtain 
his consent to undertake relator proceedings. (Cappelletti, 
1975) In spite of the undeniable usefulness of the relator 
proceedings device, it has obvious disadvantages. It is 
undesirable to have to rely on the consent of an authority 
who is at the same time a member of government, especially 
when by their very nature these actions will frequently be 
sought against government. Moreover the courts have generally 
held the exercise of the Attorney-Generalis discretion to 
grant or refuse relator proceedings is not reviewable. 
The courts' restrictive attitude towards standing 
seems to have stemmed in part from fear of a flood of 
litigation, and in part from the belief that persons 
directly affected are the best ones to put the issues before 
the court. There is undoubtedly merit in the latter view where 
the substance of the litigation concerns, for example, a 
claim that the plaintiff has been unfaitly denied a license 
as a resul t of an abuse of discretionary power. But it is not 
at all persuasive where the illegal action has no direct 
impact on legally recognised private interests but signifi-
cantly affects interests held by the public in common. 
As Stein (1979) rightly points out, litigants are unlikely 
to spend time and money unless they have a real interest at 
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stake. Restrictive rules of standing simply r~sult ~n the 
anomalous position that the more people who are affected by 
an illegal act the less likely it is to be challenged. The 
courts have severely impeded their ability to uphold the rule 
of law by adopting such self-imposed rules. 
The belief that protection of the public interest 
should be left to the Attorney-General has come in for 
increasing criticism from environmentalists amongst others, 
leading to calls for relaxation or total abolition of the 
1 f t .. 50 ru es 0 s analng. In 1978 the Public and Administyative 
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Law Reform Committee considered the question of standing for 
judicial review. It recommended adoption of a single test 
of "sufficient interest" which it felt was broad enough to 
cover litigants whose interests are not distinct from interests 
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shared by the public generally. As yet there has been 
no legisJative response to this recommendation. However, as 
noted above, the Courts seemed to have taken a more liberal 
attitude of their own accord, no doubt in response to the 
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chahging climate of opinion. The Court of Appeal was 
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a restrictive approach to standing, even thQugh the English 
decision was based on a statutory provision. It granted 
standing to the Environmental Defense Society and the Royal 
Forest and Bird Protection Society to challenge administrative 
action taken under the National Development Act. The general 
tenor of the court's decision suggested that a ]iberaJ approacb 
would continue to be followed in future. Nevertheless, 
the decision placed emphasis on the purpose and policy of 
the National Development Act. 54 The court expressly left 
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open the question of standing where review is sought of 
administrative actions governed by other legislation. 
Inevitably, therefore, uncertainty remains, making legis-
lative reform desirable. 
Judicial review provides the courts with varied 
and flexible tools for controlling the actions of the 
executive branch. It can make a useful contribution 
to the resolution of resource or environmental disputes 
between citizen and State even though the courts must 
operate within the confines of concern with illegality 
rather than with the merits of an act or decision. 
A successful action may, of course, result in the 
enforcement of a statutory duty or invalidation of an 
action or decision. Although the courts can only set 
aside an ultra vires decision or order it to be reconsidered 
in accordance with the law, the practical outcome will 
often be the same as a finding on the merits. If a 
decision is found to be ultra vires for unreasonableness, 
the decision-maker is effectively precluded from reaching 
the same decision again. Where challenge is based on 
a ground such as irrelevancy or improper purpose, the 
courts will only exercise their power to set aside if 
they are satisfied that the decision would have been 
different but for the irrelevancy or improper reason. 
(Smillie, 1980) Clearly, challenge on procedural grounds 
does not necessarily prevent the decision-maker from ultimately 
reaching tIle same decision, but again, a remedy may well be 
denied in that instance (ibid). 
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Review also serves a number of other purposes. 
The ~emonstrable willingne~s of the courts to scrutinise 
the actions of all administrators from the highest 
government officials to the most lowly, should encourage 
better administrative decision-making. Review based on 
grounds such as irrelevance, unreasonableness, wrong purpose, 
and insufficiency of evidence forces administrators to 
justify their decisions in a public forum, subject to the 
close scrutiny of cross-examination. The judicial process 
ensures that they listen to and respond to viewpoints or 
values which they have chosen to ignore) of which they were 
unaware, or which they had underestimated the strength or 
feeling about. The need to openly justify decisions, and in 
doing so, to take account of opposing points of view, must 
have a beneficial effect on planning. Even an action 
which is unsuccessful on legal grounds may, by highlighting 
strength of public feeling about an issue, result in a 
decision being modified. Of course, not all grounds of 
review will allow a direct airing of resource management 
issues. This is obviously true in the case of challenge 
on procedural grounds, but it is also true where a fairly 
narrow point of statutory interpretation is involved. 
It needs emphasising here, once again, that the possibilities 
for review are closely linked with the nature of the 
legislation in question. If an Act gives clear precedence 
to development over environmental values review may be of 
little avail. However, by emphasising this, unsuccessful 
review may provide the necessary stimulus to give reform 
of the legislation in question a higher place on the political 
, 
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agenda. 
It must be admitted, however, "that review is an 
expensive means of improving the planning process, achieving 
participation in decision-making or gaining legislative 
reform. It is, therefore, unlikely to be undertaken 
unless there is a reasonable prospect of influencing the 
outcome of a decision. As we have seen broad discretions 
to make policy, a common feature of environmental legis-
lation, reduce the lil,elihood of a favourable outcome,55 
although they also allow greater scope to argue that 
resource management criteria should have been considered. 
This paradoxical situation highlights the difficulties of 
using review (the basic aim of which is to ensure that 
administrators remain within the powers granted to them 
by the legislature) to effect sound resource management 
practices. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
AN EXPANDED ROLE FOR THE COURTS? 
We saw in Chapter Two that the emphasis of the 
law of torts on injury to private interests constitutes 
a serious impediment to the use of those actions for 
protecting the environment or ensuring wise resource 
management. Even the action of public nuisance, 
though capable of directly addressing environmental 
issues, suffers from the requirement that a plaintiff 
must show some injury greater than the public at large. 
In Chapter Three we saw that, at least until very 
recently, the value of the so-called public law actions 
has also been impeded by the need for a plaintiff to 
£how injury to private interests. The most recent 
decisions indicate a willingness on the part of the 
courts to grant standing to those concerned with the 
environment, where this interest is affected, but it 
cannot be stated with certainty th~t the barriers have 
finally fallen. We saw, too, that the concern of the 
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courts with the legality of the actions or decisions 
being challenged rather than with their merits, restricts 
the usefulness of these actions for dealing with environ-
mental issues. 
In response to these limitations, a number of 
jurisdictions in the United States have enacted measures 
which are designed to overcome the limitations of the 
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common law and strengthen the role of the courts in 
dealing with environmental issues. Should similar 
legislation be adopted in New Zealand? No attempt is 
made here to give a definite answer to this question. 
Rather, the purpose of the present chapter is to outline 
the types of reforms which have been adopted and to 
examine their implications. 
There have been four main types of reform . 
. 1) Liberalisation of standing to sue by eliminating 
the requirement that private parties seeking redress 
for environmental injuries must show injury to private 
interests. 
2) Creation of an enforceable legal right to environ-
mental quality. 
3) Alteration of the burden of proof rules. 
4) Authorisation of judicial review on the merits in 
relation to alleged harm to the environment. 
All of these measures are incorporated into the Michigan 
1 . 
Environmental Protection Act 1970, the most far-reaching 
and influential reform which has provided a model for 
2 
a number of subsequent statutes. Because of its 
breadth and its importance as a precedent I will discuss 
the Michigan Act in some detail. 
The legislation ~uthorises any person or organisa 
tion to bring an action "for the protection of the air, 
water and other natural resources and the public trust 
therein from pollution, impairment or destruction" 
against any legal entity whose conduct has or is likely 
3 to cause such harm. Once the plaintiff has demonstrated 
that the defendant's conduct has or is likely to cause 
harm, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant who 
must show either that the allegations are untrue or 
that "there is no feasible and prudent alternative to 
[his] conduct and that such conduct is consistent with 
the promotion of the public health, safety and welfare 
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in light of the state's paramount concern for the 
protection of its natural resources from pollution, 
impairment or destruction.,,4 If an action is successful 
a court may grant an injunction or impose any conditions 
which are required to protect the environment. 5 The 
courts are also empowered to set standards for pollution 
control where any standards relevant to the action in 
question are found to be deficient. 6 Provision is made 
for an action concerning matters which would normally 
be the subject of administrative proceedings (such as 
planning hearings or licensing hearings) to be remitted 
to such proceedings. However, the court retains the 
jurisdiction to review the outcome of the proceeding to 
ensure that adequate protection from pollution, impairment 
or destruction has been afforded. 7 
As well as creating a cause of action for protection 
of the environment, the Act provides that where adminis 
trative proceedings or .judicial review of such proceedings 
involve conduct which it is alledged wj.ll affect the 
rights protected by the legislation, it must be determined 
whether this is so. No conduct I!shall be authorised or 
approved, which does, or is likely to have such effect 
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so long as there is a feasible and prudent alternative 
consistent with the reasonable requirements of the 
8 public health, safety and welfare. 1I Persons asserting 
that the proceeding does involve conduct likely to 
cause harm ~o the environ~ent may be joined as parties 
9 to the proceeding, but this is not mandatory. 
In essence, therefore, the Act recognises a public 
right to a decent environment and creates a duty to 
take environmental considerations into account, which 
10 is enforceable by anyone. Its effect is to give the 
courts the final power of decision in relation to any 
.environmental dispute where it is invoked, unless the 
decision is overriden by the legislature. No criteria 
are provided to guide the courts in reaching their 
decisions. It was intended by the author of the legis-
lation that the courts should be left "to formulate a 
solution appropriate to the occasion", "rather than to 
crea te confining definition? II. (Sax, 1971, p. 248) 
Some of the variants on this Act limit the action to 
protection of defined ecologically valuable areas. 
(DiMento, 1977) Others provide the defense of statutory 
authorisation where the conduct which i~ the subject of 
an action is in compliance with permits or regUlations. 
(Bryden, 1978) 
The arguments put forward in support of an expanded 
role for the courts can be summarised as follows: 
1) Administrative behaviour typically eX]libits charac 
teristics which inhibit good decision-making. Because 
administrators are zealous to protect their own programmes 
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they tend to become inordin~tely responsive to the 
special interests in society that they are created to 
regulate or assist, at the expense of other interests, 
particularly unorganised or under-represented interests 
such as erivironmental interests. (Sax, 1971; Rosenbaum, 
1981) Agencies with development oriented functions 
readily align themselves with developmental interests to 
enhance their organisational power and try to ignore, 
if possible, the environmental harm caused by their 
activities which threatens their power. (Weisbrod, 1978) 
This is an aspect of what Sax (1971) terms lithe insider 
perspective", decision-making influenced by the corporate 
needs of the administrative agency which have nothing to 
do with the public interest. 11 Indeed, administrators 
often seek to extend their power under the guise of lithe 
public interest!!. (Rosenbaum, 1981) The bias in 
. 
favour of organised interests in the decision-making 
process is exacerbated by a tendency for administrators 
to economise on the costs of gathering information by 
limiting the range of alternatives considered and relying 
on existing information or information supplied by 
organised interests. Frequently the result of this is 
that past policies are continued, even though they have 
failed. (WeislJrod, 1978) These problems are said to 
be so deeply entrenched that although administrative 
reforms are desirable, the oniy real solution lies in a 
fundamental realignment of power. Hence it is necessary 
to open access to the courts to interest groups that are 
under-represented in the normal decision-making processes 
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and grant the courts power to review administrative 
\ 
decisions on the merits. The political neutrality 
of the courts, it is believed, will ensure that they 
do not fall prey to the insider perspective syndrome. 
(Sax, 1971; Oakes, 1977) 
2) The judicial process, once commenced, must be 
completed, whether by settlement or by judgment. Hence, 
judicial proceedings can force issues onto the political 
agenda which it has been found convenient to delay 
delaing with or to ignore. (Sax, 1971) . Furthermore, 
with the best will in the world, administrators cannot 
deal with all problems. Legal proceedings allow some 
of these issues to be addressed as a result of the 
initiative of private citizens. (Sax, 1971) 
3) Legislators cannot anticipate all problems in advance. 
The courts are able to respond more quickly to new 
problems as they arise than the legislative or the admin-
istrative process. (Sax, 1971; Cappelletti, 1981) 
4) Court proceedings force problems to be confronted in 
concrete terms . Major environmental problems are often 
. discussed at such an abstract'level that action is 
interminably delayed. The concrete nature of legal 
proceedings allows small beginnings to be made in tackling 
these large problems. (Sax, 1971) 
5) Because law suits are tailor-made to particular facts, 
they are more precise and discriminating tools for 
environmental control than broad regulatory devices. 
(Tribe 1973) 
, 
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6. Court proceedings encourage private initiative and 
allow a sense of direct participation in the democratic 
process.. (Cappelletti, 1975 and 1981; Sax, 1971; 
Tribe, 1973) 
7. The courts have the p6ssibility of being in continuou~ 
and actual contact with the concrete ,problems of society 
while at the same time being sheltered to an extent from 
the pressures of the moment. (Cappelletti, 1975) 
8. The courts do not suffer from the difficulties and 
perils of prophecy which beset legislative and regulatory 
measures. They work through specific case~ developing 
the law on a step by step basis. General principles are 
evolved after a process of trial and error which minimises 
the risk of unintended consequences. 
Rosenbaum, 1981) 
(Cappelletti, 1975; 
The arguments most frequently cited in opposition 
to extending the role of the courts to the extent proposed 
in measures such as the Michigan Environmental Protection 
Act can be summarised as follows: 
1. The courts lack the technical competence or the 
institutional capacity to deal with complex environmental 
issues. Judges are ill-equipped to deal with the 
technical knowledge from a diverse variety of unrelated 
disciplines that typify most environmental issues. 
(Cramton and Boyer, 1972) The very nature of judicjal 
. proceedings means that the courts are reliant on the expert 
evidence presented to them by the opposing parties. 
, .~, . 
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Parties simply find experts willing to support their 
case, therefore, the courts are not presented with a fair 
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information but they often lack the skill and experience 
to interpret such information as they receive. (Horowitz, 
1977) Furthermore, the courts do not have the capacity 
to undertake research, devise programmes to test probJ,ems 
or to investigate alternatives. They cannot hire consultants 
or break down problems into manageable units to be dealt 
with by different people. (Stevens, 1964; Cramton and 
Boyer, 1972) Once a decision is made, they lack the 
machinery to receive reports on the implementation of their 
decisions, to do follow up stud on their effect, or to 
ameliorate any unintended adverse consequences. (Horowitz, 
1977) Judicial decision-making is inevitably spasmodic 
and unsystematic because it must be initiated by the 
parties and the judge only has power to deal with the 
issues before him. (Jaffe, 1971; Cappelletti, 1975) 
This prevents consideration of policy priority. (Horowitz, 
1977) There is often inconsistency between the decisions 
of courts until resolved by a higher court. (Cramton and 
Boyer, 1972) 
2. The court system has evolved to deal with two-sided 
controversies where the facts are within the knowledge or 
control of the parties and a 'yes' or 'no' answer is called 
for. (Flick, 1979) Environmental controversies, however, 
are characterised by what have been termed 'polycentric' 
problems - problems in which there are a "multiplicity of 
variable and interlocking factors r decision on each of 
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which pres4Pposes decisions on all others.,,13 There is 
no 'right' answer to such problems as they are essentially 
political in nature. By dealing with political questions, 
the courts place at. risk the appearance of impartiality. 
Their.mosL important function is removal of the senqe of 
injustice. If they are perceived as being partial they 
threaten this function and undermine their key importance 
in assuring the rule of law. (Cramton and Boyer, 1972; 
Moeller, 1978; Devlin, 1979) 
3. The judiciary, unlike the legislative branch, is not 
accountable to the public and unlike both the legislature 
and the administrative branch, it is not open to lobbying 
or other means of allowing participation by many interested 
groups. (Cramton and Boyer, 1972; Moeller, 1978) 
4. Readiness to resolve disputes by litigation causes 
political consciousness to atrophy. Rather than stimu-
lating private initiative, by leaving decisions to the 
courts, "citizens will soon forget how to. fight for their 
own interests in the political arena". (Moeller, 1978 
p. 818; Stewart, 1975) 
5. Environmental litigation directed against administrative 
agencies impedes rational long-range planning, policy 
formulation and regulation by diverting attention to 
individual controversies. (Cramton and Boyer, 1972) 
6. There is no guarantee that the litigants in judicial 
proceedings are representative of the problem being dealt 
with. This brings danger of reductionist solutions. 
(Horowitz, 1977) 
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7. Lawsuits cause un~ecessary and expensive delays in 
resource use decisions. (Cramton and Boyer, 1972; 
Stewart, 1975; Moeller, 1978) 
8. Unrestrained use of judicial procedures for resolving 
environmental disputes will clog the court system, diverting 
scarce judicial resources'aw8.:Y from the matters they are 
most competent to adjudicate. (Cramton and Boyer, 1972) 
9. Litigation is an expensive and inefficient way of 
achieving better public participation in environmental 
decision-making. (Cramton and Boyer, 1972) 
It is clear from the various arguments for and 
aga a greater role for the courts listed above that 
these are to some extent contradictory. Furthermore, 
the validity of some of the arguments can only be verified 
by empirical testing. A limited number of follow-up 
stud have been made of the Michigan and similar Acts. 
(Sax and Conner, 1972; Haynes, 1976; DiMento, 1977; 
Bryden, 1978) These provide some support for both the 
advocates and critics of a greater role for the courts. 
No evidence emerged in support of the view that such 
1 islation would result in overcrowding of the courts 
or cause unacceptable delays. (Haynes, 1976; DiMento, 
1977; Bryden, 1978) Environmental litigation under the 
Michigan Act comprised 0.02% of the courts' case load 
and their average duration from filing suit to resolution 
of appeal was twelve months. (Haynes, 1976) The 
surveys did not investigate whether the length of legal 
proceedings caused actual delay to the projects of a 
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corresponding length. Of course, the acceptability 
or non-acdeptability of delay must b~ balanced against 
the end result - whether gains, if anys achieved for 
the environment or improvements in administrative behaviour 
out-weigh the losses caused by delay. The surveys did 
not attempt to make any assessment of this. It was clear, 
however, that the Act was used successfully in a number 
of situations which previously fell outside statutory or 
regulatory control. (Haynes, 1976) 
An early survey of litigants under the Michigan 
Act revealed that the majority of both plaintiffs and 
,defendants perceived the judges involved in their liti-
gation as capable of dealing with the issues involved. 
(Sax and Conner, 1972; DiMento, 1977) However, no 
attempt was made by the authors of the study to assess 
the complexity of the cases surveyed. 
The authors of a preliminary survey of the first 
sixteen months of operation of the Michigan Act found that 
lawsuits proved a useful device for defusing volatile 
controversies. (Sax and Conner, 1972) Neither this 
nor subsequent surveys attempted to assess whether there 
was any change in the public perception of the courts' 
impartiality as a result of their deciding issues which 
were essentially political in nature. 
Hopes that easing access to the courts would 
result in a rise in actions by formerly under-represented 
groups do not seem to have been realised. Few actions 
were brought by public interest law firms or environmental 
groups. There was, in fact, evidence that such groups, 
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because of limited budgets, tended to concentrate their 
resources on direct political lobbying. It seems that 
the courts are not perceived as such a valuable forum 
a~ their most ardent supporters would have us believe. 
Analysis of cases brought under a similar Act in 
Minnesota showed that the typical plaintiff was an 
aggrieved property owner. (Bryden, 1978) 
In spite of the disqussion contained in the surveys 
cited above, one may agree with DiMento. (1977 p. 447) 
who states that Ilthere remains much room for debate on 
the advisability of such laws ll , The most fundamental 
~riticisms of this kind of legislation, those relating 
to the institutional capacity of the courts to deal 
with environmental issues and those concerned with the 
constitutional difficulties entailed in this sort of 
legislation, have not been adequately addressed. In the 
present context it is only possible to indicate those 
areas where further debate is"essential. 
, . 
While the provisions relating to standing' contained' 
in the Michigan Act may seem attractive to environmen-
talists, they raise important issues which their advocates 
tend to overlook. Unrestrained access to the courts, in 
association with an enforceable legal right to environ-
mental quality, or the right to seek judicial review on 
the merits, provide no means for exclusion from the 
jurisdiction of the courts cases which they are manifestly 
unsuited to deal with.14 Under public nuisance the 
scope of the tort is, in part, defined by the rules of 
" 
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standing. The sUbstantive environmental right provided 
in the Michigan Act contains nothing to delimit the 
scope of the action. It would be possible, for example, 
to bring an actiQnag~inst drivers of all motor vehicles 
within the state, to prevent them using their vehicles. 
Although such an action would be unlikely to succeed, it 
is a waste of scarce judicial resources to entertain 
cases which are so totally unsuited to resolution in the 
courts. It seems clear that criteria need to be developed 
to define more carefully the extent of th~ courts' juris-
diction. The question then arises whether the courts 
should be left to decide the criteria for excluding 
inappropriate actions, or whether this is a matter for 
the I slature. 
The development of workable criteria is, in 
itself, a complex issue. In framing criteria, due 
consideration must be given to the undeniable weaknesses 
of the court system for dealing with complex resource 
management issues. If suitable criteria can be defined 
this would remove force from some of the criticisms 
concerning the expansion of the courts' role. It does 
not, however, displace the constitutional objections 
which have been raised in expanding the role of the 
courts. 
Constitutional issues become most accute in 
considering judicial review on the merits. If the 
courts are able to set aside administrative regulations 
or frame new regulations, they are clearly taking on a 
law~making function. This is fundamentally opposed to the 
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doctrine of the separation of powers. The uncertain 
benefits to the environment resulting from the granting 
of such powers must be carefully weighed against possible 
threats to the courts'fundamental role, that of upholding 
the rule of law. Furthermore, it has to be asked why 
such power should be granted only in relation to 
environmental matters when other issues are arguably 
as important. 
Given the constitutional sensitivity of judicial 
review on the merits, it needs to be considered whether 
appeal to an independant administrative tribunal would 
'not be just as suitable a remedy. These need not be 
constrained by the adversary format of the courts, can 
draw on the resources of the administration to g~ther 
information and so on. If the courts were to be 
modified to achieve the flexibility possible with an 
administrative hearing, they would cease to be courts. 
In focusing so exclusively on the judiciary, advocates 
of a greatly expanded role for the courts seem to have 
overlooked other, perhaps more satisfactory, means 
available to achieve the results they s to obtain 
through the courts. That the courts can and should 
continue to respond more effectively to the pressing 
environmental problems of the day, is undoubted. It 
is far from clear that the contribution they can make 
is so important as to justify fundamental alterations to 
their constitutional role. The doubts which have been 
raised concerning the effectiveness of the Michigan Act 
in achieving wider representation of interests, one of 
86 
its major goals~ demands that closer attention be paid 
to alternative means of improving representation in 
administrative decision-making. The effectiveness of 
such an Act in the New Zealand context may be considei'ed 
even more doubtful~ given the generally less litigious 
character of New Zealanders and the absence of public 
interest law firms. Achievement of the other goals of 
such legislation may prove equally elusive. It may well 
be~ as Stewart (1975) ane DiMento (1977) suggest~ that 
the discretioLary behaviour of administrators will be 
altered more durably through pervasive changes in the 
social environment in which they function than through 
the effect of sporadic legal decisions. 
Emphasis on judicial review of the merits of 
administrative decisions has diverted attention away from 
the potential for more modest reforms of the power to 
review~ which respect both the constitutional role of the 
courts and the inherent limitations of the adjudicative 
approach to decision-making. At present judicial review 
has tended to focus on the boundaries of discretion. 
This gives insufficient weight'to the fact that the centre 
of policy-making has, f6r all intents and purposes, 
shifted from the legislative to the administrative branch. 
(van Gunsteren, 1976) Effective protection against 
arbitrary uses of power requires the development of 
criteria that look not just to the boundaries of power 
but which are also capable of controlling the manner of 
exercising discretion within the boundaries. The rules 
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of natural justice do this but criteria which relate 
to the substance of decisions are lacking. The courts 
might do more, for example, to ensure that administrators 
exercising planning or management functions either explore 
all reaso~able options, 'or can provide sound reasons for 
not doing so . This, of course, is clearly capable pf 
. falling within the existing ground of relev~ncy but it 
goes further than the courts are at present prepared to go 
on that ground. Similarly, it would seem possible ,to 
develop criteria to ensure that factors such as irreversi-
bility, impact of decisions on future generations and 
~ustainability of resources, are given adequate consider-
ation in decision-making processes. Although creative 
interpretation should allow such criteria to be implied 
into legislation which is silent as to these matters, 
a statute which incorporates environmental concerns into 
all legislation, as the Michigan Act does, would undoubtedly 
assist the judiciary in developing criteria. 
In conclusion, it is indisputable that improved 
methods of decision making are essential if sound 
environmental policies and wise resource management 
practices are to be implemented. The courts can make 
a valuable contribution in this area. It is probable, 
however, that those who advocate an expanded role for 
the courts expect too much from the judicial system. 
As DiMento (1977, p. 428) has stated: "even if it can 
be established that ·the citizen suit can serve a legitimate 
and useful function in environmental policy-making, an 
, ,~ 
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important question remains as to whether there are more 
cost-effective methods for accomplishing the same 
objec ti ves. II 
If the courts are to retain their vital function 
in upholding the rule of law they must be able to respond 
to the changing needs of society. In facing the problems 
of environmental control and resource allocation the 
role of the courts has already begun to change from within. 
It is a measure of the magnitude of these problems that 
we are now forced to consider whether the role of the 
courts is able to evolve rapidly enough to meet these 
challenges. Yet in the face of these pressures to 
expand the role of the courts it is essential that, as 
with a Bill of Rights, society should be given the 
opportunity to debate the issues in a fully informed way. 
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FOOTNOTES 
INTHODUCTION 
1. Annan v National Water and Soil Conservation 
Authority and Minipter of Energy (No 2) (1982) 
8 NZTPA 369. 
2. The actions of our lawmakers in relation to the 
Clyde Dam demonstrate that they too, for the 
most part, have an imperfect understanding of the 
respective roles of the courts and Parliament. 
For discussion of the constitutional issues involved 
see article by Brookfield (1983). 
CHAPTER ONE 
/ 
,1. The system of rules concerned with prevention and 
control of abuse of discretionary powers is dealt 
with in Chapter Three. 
2. O'Keefe and Farrands (1976) note that the first 
clear expression of the concept in Britain dates 
from the thirteenth century but its origins are 
traceable back to Greek and Roman thought. 
3. 
4. 
ke the rule of law concept, this doctrine has 
~ long history, traceable back to Aristotle. 
However, it was stated in its purest and best 
known form by the eighteenth-century French political 
philosopher, Montesquieu.(de Smith, 1973) 
The Executive Council comprises the Governor 
and the Ministers of the Crown. 
ral 
5. The very nature of liti ion ensures some degree 
of law-making. Usually litigation is only proceeded 
within situations which differ in some degree from 
previously litigated situations. If the legal outcome 
can be anticipated, the parties are most likely to 
settle their disputes. The application of the law 
to resolve conflict in a new area results in the 
making of a new rule which will apply in all like 
situations in the future. 
6. The doctrine of precedent requires that courts 
lower in the heirnrchy of courts follow the decisions 
of rior courts on similar issues. Courts at 
the same level of jurisdiction are not bound by each 
others decisions. The Privy Council is at the apex 
of our irarchy of courts but only its decisions 
relating to New Zealand are binding on us. Otber 
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Privy Council deci ons are persuasive but not 
binding, as is also true of English House of Lords 
decisions. European Civil Law jurisdictions do 
not follow this doctrine. Posner (1977) points 
out that without the doctrine, the volume of 
litigation would rise because of reduction in 
certainty. He also points out that it reduces 
the cost of litigation to the parties because it 
incorporates information that has been generated 
in previous cases. However, if too rigidly ad-
hered to it reduces the ability of the courts to 
adapt to social change. In practice, imaginative 
judges have always found a variety of techniques 
for circumventing undesirable precedent. 
7. See for example Jaffe, 1969; Devlin, 1976, 1979; 
Horowitz, 1977; Moeller, 1978; LUcke, 1983. 
8. It usually takes the form of Proclamations, Orders-
in-Council , Regulations, Hules or By-laws. The 
usual justifications given for Executive law-making 
are that emergency conditions requiring urgent 
9. 
action can best be handled by this form of 1 slation 
which doesn't go through the lengthj procedures 
required to pass a statute; that it permits flexi-
bility and opportunity to experiment; and that 
Parliament does not have time to consider matters 
of det 1 or technicality. (Palmer, 1979) 
These are valid enough reasons and law-making by 
the Executive is acceptable provided that there 
is adequate protection against abuse. This question 
is examined in Chapter Three. 
This statement is not strictly correct. The 
Governor-General acting in his own right possesses 
power to make subordinate leg lation. However, 
this power has never been exercised. (Palmer, 1979) 
10. However, it is possible that an act might be declared 
invalid if it were not made for the peace, order or 
good government of New Zealand as required by section 
53 of the New Zealand Constitution Act. In pract e, 
of course, it would be an extraordinary statute that 
did not fall within such broad grounds. Moreover, 
it is arguable that a statute which doesn't comply 
with section 53 could be said to impliedly repeal 
it. For further discussion see M.ulholland, 1980. 
An act could also be invalidated in the unlikely 
event of established procedures for enacting 
legislation not being followed. 
11. A written constitution is not inalterable but it 
can only be altered by a specially prescribed 
procedure which is more difficult than for ordinary 
legislation. Typically the procedure for amendment 
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will require that the amending provision be passed 
by a'special majority of the legislature (e.g. 75%) 
or be submitted to referendum or perhaps both. 
For discussion of the pros and cons of a written 
constitution see Palmer, 1979; Jaconell~ 1980. 
12. Se~ for example Abel-Smit~ and Stevens, 1967; 
Jaffe, 1969; Jaconelli, 1980. 
13. Under this approach to interpretation judges held 
that the literal meaning of the words of a statute 
would prevail even though this resulted in a 
conclusion inconsistent with what the judge believed 
to be the primary purpose of the statute. 
14. London Street Tramway Co. v L.C.C. [1898] AC 375. 
This is one aspect of the doctr ne of precedent. 
15. The Oxford Companion to Law notes that it is hard 
to state the precise basis of the distinction. 
Although public law generally deals with relations 
between citizen and state as opposed to relations 
between citizen and citizen, we shall see that 
government agencies may both initiate or be the 
subject of private law act 
CHAPTER 'l'WO 
1 • The most significant discussions of this issue in 
New Zealand are a brief survey by Holm (1976) and 
by Williams (1980) in his textbook on environmental 
law. Most discussion has taken place in the 
United States. See for example, Lohrmann (1970), 
Bryson and Macbeth (1972), Yannocone et al (1972), 
Tribe (1973), Baurer (1980), Fischer T1981), Large 
and Michie (1981). The International Bar Associ-
ation (1978) has addr the question of control 
of pollution through torts. 
2. Street (1983) bel s gases and flame would be 
physical matter within the rule, but not vibrations. 
Traditionally, only invasion by tangible physical 
matter has been actionable but courts in the United 
States have gone so far as to include vibrations 
as well as fumes and gases. (Lohrmannn, 1980) 
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3. A negligent act is one a reasonable person would 
foresee as leading to invasion of the interest 
which constitutes that tort. (Street, 1983) 
In practise where that act is negligent the action 
of negligence will usually be brought because the 
courts will apply the negligence test for liability 
(damages will be available only for harm which was 
a reasonably foreseeable con~equence of the trespass). 
On the other hand, where the trespass is intentional 
the prevailing view seems to be that the plaintiff 
can recover for any consequential injury, whether 
foreseeable or not (strict liability). Fleming (1983), 
Street (1983) takes the view that the burden of 
proving negligence rests on the plaintiff in 
conformity with the tort of negligence but Fleming 
(1983) considers the rule to be unsettled. 
4. Thus, if water, for example, is discharged upon 
someone else's property and ultimately flows to 
the plaintiff he has no cause of action in trespass; 
He must bring an alternative action. 
5. Southport Corporation v Esso Petrolewn Co. Ltd. [1954J 
2QB 182 CA (UK) supported by the House of Lords 
[1956] AC 218 at pp 242, 244. 
6. Jones v Llanrwst D.D.C. [1911] lCh 393. See also 
Gregory v ~er (1829) 9 B & C 59·1 (rubbish rolled 
onto plaintiff's land by wind is trespass). 
7. 221 Ore. 86, 342 P. 2d 790 (1959) cited in 
Lohrmann, (1970). The deposit of fluoride from 
the defendant's aluminium smelter contaminated 
forage and water on the plaintiff's land, causing 
poisoning of his cattle. 
8. Remedies will be di~cussed further below. 
9. The precedent for pollution is well established. 
See for example §t He.len I s Smel tin!; Co. v Tipping 
(1865) 11 H.L. Cas. 642 (fumes from a copper-
smelting plant); Nichols v El Beet Fac 
L~d. [1936J Ch. 343. C.A. (e actory). 
10. Clearlit~ v Auckland City Corporation [1976J 
2 NZLR 729 (defendant a licensee of land occupiea. 
by the plaint iff) . However in S2~1~hport Corp. 
(supra note 5) Lord Denning held there could be no 
nuisance where the nuisance emanated from a ship 
at sea.) 
11. For example, a landowner may become I iable for spread 
of fire from his property, although it was started 
by lightning (Landon v Rutherford! 1951J NZLR 975) 
or for harm caused 'by subsidence, although resulting 
from geological condi tions (Leah:ey v Nati~nal Trust 
[1980] ., All En 17 CAl. 
93 
12. See for example Geothermal Produce New Zealand 
Ltd. v Goldie App~icators Ltd. ['-983) BeL 166 
(damage caused by an isolated incidence of spray 
drift). 
13. Because this is an action to protect interests 
in land it is clear that damages cannot be 
recovered where personal injury alone occurs. 
It is less clear whether damages are recoverable 
for personal injury which is consequential upon 
harm to property. There appears to be no 
authority on this point. However, they have 
been held to be recoverable for public nuisance, 
so the same "rule seems likely to be applied to 
private nuisance. 
14.Clearlite (supra, note 10) per Mahon J. at p. 741. 
See V6nnell (1977). 
15. See below (P. 42) for further discussion of the 
relationship between statutes and torts. 
16. Boomer v At ic Cement (1970) 257 NE 2d 870. 
17. To qualify as a nuisance it is sufficient that 
the interference materially affects a class of 
the public or a representative cross section of 
the class. Attorney-General v P.Y.A. ar ies 
Ltd. [1 975 ] 1 A 11 E R 894 . Some stu t e s e s ish 
the crime of public nuisance but the action is not 
confined to statutorily defined nuisances. 
18. An action in tort has the advantage over a criminal 
action that the complai~need only be proved o~ 
the balance of probabilities instead of the much 
more stringent criminal standard of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt. 
19. This is based on the policy (increasingly under 
challenge) that redress for wrong to the community 
should be left to the Attorney eneral as its 
representative. Where monetary compensation is 
sought, it is logical enough to restrict a right of 
action to a plaintiff who has suffered injury 
greater than the public at large. There is no 
reason why a person who has suffered the same injury 
as the rest of the public should receive compensa-
tion. This logic does not apply where an injunction 
is sought, because this remedy will benefit everyone 
alike. 
20. Relator proceedings will be deal t wi th in Chapter 
Three. 
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21. It.is, of course, open to the administering 
agencies concerned with public lands and water 
ways to bring actions in either public or private 
nuisance. However, actions by members of the 
public have great value where the administering 
agency shows little inclination to prevent the 
nuisance, perhaps on account of scarcity of 
resources, perhaps because another government 
agency is causing the nuisance. Where the admin-
istering agency is the cause of the nuisance it 
22. 
is likely that public law remedies will be the 
on ly ones available ( if at all). See Chapter TInee 
and see discussion of the relationship between 
torts and statutes below. 
Hickey v ec. Reduction (1970) 21 DLR 3d 368. 
23. See for example Kapisek v Cather and Sons Con 
struction Inc. (1962) 117 NW 2d 322 (action 
against emissions from an asphalt plant). 
/ 
24. In this case the basis of the plaintiff's claim 
is harm to interests which are the subject of 
strongly held beliefs. This may include concern 
for environmental conservation. 
25. Kent v Minister for Works (1973) 2 ACTR 26 
26. 
The Judge was, however, prepared to say that injury 
to flora and fauna in a public reserve could 
constitute a public nuisance although on the facts 
he did not find sufficient interference to justify 
a decision in favour of the plaintiff. 
Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] 
AC 728 HL. The law of negfigence is at present 
undergoing considerable development in the area 
of the duty of care to be ascribed to public 
authorities. Recent decisions which may have 
considerable importance from a resource management 
perspective concern duty of care in giving planning 
approvals and granting subdivision approvals. 
For a thorough discussion see Palmer (1982). 
See also Blewman v ilkin 1979 2 ~ZL~ 208 CA 
concerning duty of care regarding excavations by 
a subdivider; Brown v Heathcote C.C. 1982 2 ~ZLR] 
584 BC conce:rning duty 0 care on part of Drainage 
Board regarding advice about susceptibility of 
land to flooding; Geothermal Produce New Zealand 
Ltd. v Goldie Applicator~ [ 1983] BCL· 166concerning 
duty of care of landowner and independent contractor 
for spraying weedkiller. 
27. The major exception is in the area of negligent 
misrepresentation but see Caltex Oil (Australia) 
.¥ty. Ltd. v The DreJige "Willemstad" (1976) 13Er-
CLR ~)29 which paves the way for a fUrther 
extension of liability. 
28. The usefulness of the 
Accident Compensation 
for personal injury. 
discussion. 
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action is also affected by the 
Act, which prohibits actions 
See below (p.44) for further 
29. The courts may interpret a duty as being only directory. 
It goes without saying that it cannot apply where the 
statute sets down a power rather than a duty. 
30. Clearly, if the statute is directed at protecting 
personal safety, an action for damages to property 
could not be sustained. 
31. Phillips v Britannia Hygiene LaundlJL Co. Ltd. [1923] 
2 KB 832 CA. Brown v Heathcote C.C. supra n 25. 
32. Not all the decisions support the view that the action 
only applies where the plaintiff suffers injury to 
an interest in land. 
33. The defense of statutory authority also applies. 
See below p. 42. 
34. Generally under other torts there must be some 
form of personal negligence before liability will 
arise for an independent contractor, e.g. failure 
to provide in the contract precautions against 
.foreseeable harm. Employers are liable for torts 
committed by servants in the course of employment. 
35. Rickards v Lothian [1913] AC 263 at 280. 
36. N.Z. Forest Products v O'Sullivan [1974] 2 NZLR 80; 
Holderness v Goslin [1975] 2 NZLR 46; Nolan 
(unreported judgement, White J. 31 Augus 
A48/73 noted in [1979] NZLJ 269). Weather condi-
tions Id to be relevant to whether the use was 
non-natural in the circumstances in all three cases. 
The Forest Products case is important in establi ing 
compensat on economic loss alone can be 
recovered even though there was no damage to land. 
The rule simply requires interference with use of 
land. 
37. Geothermal Produce New Zealand Ltd. v Goldie 
Applicators (supra). 
38. Knight v Bolton [1924] NZLR 806. 
39. Simpson v b_t torney-General [1959 J NZLR 546. 
40. See p. 20 above. Al though the issue was raisod 
in relation to private nuisance, it is relevant 
to a greater or lesser extent for all these actions 
with the exception of public nuisance. 
'" 
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41. Relator actions or actions initiated by the 
Attorney-General would be possible. 
42. A public nuisance a~tion might be conceivable 
but might well be rejected on the grounds that 
the issue was not one the courts are fit to 
decide. Even if the courts did undertake 
jurisdiction, in most cases the plaintiffs would 
face serious difficulties in overcoming a defense 
of statutory authorisation for the resource 
development. 
43. N.Z. Forest Products v O'Sullivan (supra). 
44. The principles the courts apply are set out in 
Morris v Redland Bricks Ltd. [1970] AC 396 
(defendants ordered to fill a clay pit to prevent 
slipping of the plaintiff's land). In general 
the injury must be substantial, and as for all 
injunctions, not able to be compensated by 
damages. 
45. This sort of difficulty could arise where what is 
needed to abate the harm is not installation of 
new technolog~ which solves the problem once done, 
but a modification in operational practice which 
is of a continuing nature. 
46. The relative strength of the cases will be taken 
into account if all other factors are equal. 
47. For fuller discussion of the principles involved 
in granting interim injunctions see Towner, 1983. 
For a discussion of injunctions generally in the 
context of environmental litigation see Williams, 
1980. 
48. Mi ller v .Jackson [1977] 1QB 966 at 980 per Lord 
Denning. Also, injunctions cannot be issued 
against the Crown. The courts will instead 
make a declaration of the rights of the parties. 
It is assumed the Crown will comply. 
49. Ken~away v Thompson [1981] Q.B. 88 (CA). In 
the United States the public interest is considered 
relevant in de6iding what form the remedy should 
take. 
50. See for example ~orris v ~edland Bricks (supra). 
51. Some of the difficulties confronting applicants 
are illustrated in Fletcher v Bealv (1885) 28 Ch.n. 
-_._._- ---"-
688 and in U~ v Reserve Mining Co. (1974) 380 
F. Supp 11 (quoted at length in Williams, 1980). Also 
Hooper v Rogers [1975J Ch 43 (erosion from track 
threatening to remove support for a building). 
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52. See Fischer, 1981 for a description of cases in 
which such technology has been used. 
53. A quite different problem can arise from statistics 
than the question of whether or not to accept 
causal links as proven. A court may be prepared 
to accept scientific testimony that a particular 
chemical causes caQcer, for example. However 
probably the most it will be possible to say is 
that the particular activity concerned will cause 
a rise of X% of cancer over what would be expected 
in the population at large. Even though there is 
a high probability that the plaintiff contracted 
his cancer as a result of the defendant's activity, 
there can seldom by any certainty, which may cause 
reluctance to impose liability. A possible 
approach would be to reduce the amount of damages 
according to the statistical probability. (This 
example could not arise in New Zealand because 
the Accident Compensation Act has displaced an 
action for damages for personal injury). 
54. For an interesting discussion of the differences 
between scientific and legal proof see Large and Michie, 
1981 . 
55. Pride of Derby 
ER 1326. 
[ 1952] 2 A 11 
56. The reason for holding each defendant fully 
liable rather than apportioning costs is that the 
~laintiff shouldn't be deprived of a remedy because 
a defendant is, for example, insolvent. The 
defendant will be left to pursue his own action 
for contributions to the damages. 
57. If there is sufficient probability that the 
defendant has significantly contributed to the 
problem but the contribution cannot be easily 
quanti ed, an injunction is clearly a more 
appropriate remedy. 
58. This is known as the rule in Summers v Tice. 
For a discussion of this rule and-the market 
share liability theory to be discussed below, 
see Fischer, 1981. 
59. J.W. Birnie Ltd. v Taupo Borough unreported judge-
ment, Haslam J. Wellington, 11 June 1975, A 153/ 
70 Hamilton, A 179/73 Rotorua. 
60. The courts' powers to control the exercise of 
statutory pow~r will be the subject of the'next 
chapter. 
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61. Manchester Cor~a tion v Farnsworth [ 1930 J 
AC 171. 
62. The court raised but left open the question of 
whether nuisance may be committed if a plant 
which was satisfactory when first built, doesn't 
keep up with beneficial changes of technology. 
63. Marriage v 
[ 1950] -I 
t Norfolk d 
64. For example, ilure to upgrade a sewage system to 
cope with an increased load. This needs to be 
contrasted with failure to exercise a duty 
discussed at p. 26 above. 
65. An action is still available for exemplary damages 
but these are only awarded in exceptional circum-
stances, as where a defendant has deliberately 
calculated that his profit will exceed the plaintiff's 
loss. Obviously, it will not be easy to prove 
intent of this kind. Donselaar v Donselaar 
[1982] 2 NZLR 97. 
66. Vennell (1975) and Klar (1983) favour restoration 
of liability in tbrt in some circumstances (e.g. 
where acts are intentional and in the case of 
hazardous products). 
CHAPTER THREE 
1. In this section the terms public authority, 
statutory authority, and administrative authority 
are used interchangeably to refer to the adminis-
trative branch of government. 
2. The leading case in this area of law is Anisminic 
Ltd. v Foreign ComJ?_~_nsation Commission [1969] 2 AC 
(The Act in question provided that the 
determination of the commission shall not be called 
in question in any court of law. This did not 
prevent the court from holding that the commission had 
exceeded its jurisdiction.) . 
3. Frequently rights of appeal are limited to questions 
of law. In this situation the distinction hetween 
law and fact becomes one of great significance. 
The two are usually closely intertwined which gives 
the court great leeway in deciding whether to hear 
an appeal or not. The Town and Country Planning 
Act and the Mining Act both confine rights of 
appeal to questions of law. The Water and Soil 
Conservation Act has no right of appeal to the 
courts at alL Appeal to the Planning Tribunal 
(which is an administrative tribunal) is final and 
conclusive. 
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4. Ultra vires means beyond the power. Where B 
atutory authority is exercising adjudicative 
powers it is usual to speak in terms of exceeding 
jurisdiction rather than acting ultra vi 
5. Courts classify procedural requirements as mandatory 
or directory. If it is classified as directory 
then non-compliance will not necessarily affect 
the validity of the action taken. Which way the 
courts will classify a procedur~ will depend upon 
a number of factors, including the consequences 
of holding an action to be invalid or whether the 
rights of individuals are substantially affected 
by failure to comply with the procedure. 
6. A.G. v Great Eastern Rail~ay Co. (1880) 5 App ~as 
475. 
7. For example in an Australian decision a local 
authority passed a byelaw requiring the addition 
of fluorine to the water supply pursuant to an 
empowe~ing provision which authorised the making 
of by-laws Itproviding for the health of the 
residents in the municipal district. II The by-law 
in question was held to be unauthorised because 
·some fluorine compounds were harmful to humans. 
Kerl v City of Sale [1964] V.R. 383. 
8. Most statutes concerned with the environment 
contain broad powers to delegate. The Clean Air 
Act contains the limitation that any delegation 
must be made to employees of the Department of 
Health. However, the most fruitful sources of 
challenge will arise from limitations as to the 
SUbstantive actions which may be carried out by 
the delegate. 
9. Carltona Ltd. v Commissioners of Works [1943J 
2 All ER 560. 
I 
10. De Smith (1973, 1973 a) classifies these three 
categories, as well as unauthorised delegation of 
powe~ as failure to exercise a discretion. 
11. Lavenqer (H)& Son Ltd. v Minister of Housing and 
Local Governmen_! [1970 J 1 WLR 1231. 
12. Bri tish Oxv~n Co_. Ltd. v Minis T1971T A C-"'-6 1 O-nrL) . ---------... ------'-'-"-
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
.17 . 
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Bromley London Boroug~~ounci I v Greater London COllneil 
n-982] 1 A 11 ER 129. The New Zealand courts T1ave~-­
adopted the same position. For a discussion see 
Caldwell, 1982. 
For example, in Ski Enterprises Ltd v Tongarairo Nat~ 
ional Park Bd.[1964] NZLR 884 the Board inserted in 
a licence to erect ski tows, a condition depriving 
itself of the right to provide access to a large part 
of the park except with the approval of the licensee. 
This was held to be inconsistent with the Board's 
primary function of administering, managing, and 
controlling the park in such a manner as to reserve 
to the public the fullest proper use and enjoyment of 
it. Other examples of agreements not to exercise 
a discretion include contracts or undertakings not 
to make or enforce a by-law, contracts to exercise 
a power in a particular way, contracts not to refuse 
a planning permission. 
This rule does not always work to the advantage of 
resource management. In Currie v Waimairi District 
Council {1983] BCL 440, e court concluded that the 
CounciT had refused a permit to build a bridge, not 
because it breached the Local Government Act as 
alleged, but in sympathy with the view of local 
residents that a reserve should be created where 
the bridge would cross the stream. 
Dannevirl~e Borough COllncll:. v Governor-General {1981] 
TNZLIl--'29. (A recommenda tion not to compulsorily 
~cquire land was based on government policy not to 
acquire Maori land, which was not part of the policy 
of the Public Worl~s Act). See also Rowlin[ v Tak~ro 
Properties Ltd. [1975] 2 NZLR 62. Consents required 
under certain regulations were refused because the 
Minister wished to see a reversion of foreign owned 
land to the Crown or New Zealand interests in accordance 
with government policy. This was outside of the scope 
of the relevant regulations; Fiordland v Minister of 
Agricul ture and Fisheries [1978] 2 NZLR 34T-(Refusal of 
game licence because not required in accordance with 
policy of rational ising the industry, but this not an 
authorised ground under the relevant regulations.) 
In tbe Al'amoana Smelter litigation the plaintiffs were 
unsuccessful in attempts to prove the decision to 
place the development on "fast track" was based on 
government policy rather than the statutory criteria. 
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v Wednesburv 
Cor]J61~<l:j::ion ! 1948] i~K13' 223; V GorkOITl v A ~Q. [1978T 
2 NZLH 387 (CA) Acting unreasona y m t also gjve 
rise to liability in tort (nuisance, negligence) as we 
saw in Chapter Two. 
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18. Decisions which involve oppressive interference 
with the rights of individuals' or are unequal in 
operation as between different classes will be 
held unreasonable. "This may form a basis for 
challenging by-laws or provisions of planning 
schemes. 
19. Ashbridge Investments Ltd. v Minister of Housing 
and Local Government [1965] 1 WLR 1320. The 
second aspect of this rule is simply another 
illustration of the requirement to act reasonably. 
20. North Taranaki Environment Protection Assoc. v 
G-Gl 1982] 1 NZLR 312 (CA). 
21. See Chapter One, footnote 8 for the forms of 
delegated legislation. A parliamentary mechanism 
for review of statutory regulations by the Statutes 
Revision Committee exists under S~anding Orders 378 
and 379. The grounds for review are in some 
respects wider than those open to the courts. For 
example,they include power to examine whether the 
regulation makes an unusual or unexpected use of 
the powers con rred by the statute. Clearly a 
power may be unusual without necessarily being ultra 
vires on one of the grounds discuss~d above. 
discussion of this procedure see Frame & McLuskie, 
1978. 
22. Other important examples of powers to make subordinate 
legislation are found in the Clean Air Act, the Soil 
Conservation and Rivers Control Act J the Water and. 
Soil Conservation Act, the Pesticides Act, the Toxic 
Substances Act and the National Development Act. 
23. The grant of discretion which relates to policy 
making must, of course, be distinguished from the 
situation discussed above, where policy is wrongly 
allowed to influence the exercise of a discretion. 
24. Unsuccessful challenges were also made on procedural 
grounds: failure to give a hearing to interested 
parties before the decision was made, predetermination, 
and effective non-compliance with the requirement to 
produce an impact report. On this last issue, it 
was argued that although an impact report had been 
done it was so deficient as to be a nullity because 
it did not consider the impact of the electricity 
supply. The Court of Appeal considered the case 
was marginal but it was not prepared to say the report 
was so defective that it did not in t constitute 
a report. But the case did establish the important 
point that discussion limited to on-site impact will 
not satisfy the statutory requirement in every context. 
Environmental Defense Society Inc. v South Pacific 
Aluminium Ltd. (No 4) r1981]' 1 NZLR 530. 
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25. Reported in EDS v South Pacific Aluminium Ltd. (No 3) 
! "19'81] 1 NZLR 216. 
26. Reported in CREEDNZ Inc. v Governor-General [1981] 
1 NZLR 172. 
27. The Court acknowledged that it will usually be more 
difficult to prove relevant matters have not been 
taken into accoun~ than an allegation that something 
has been taken into account which should not have 
been. See cases ei ted in .ilote 16 for examples. 
28. The courts frequently use the term quasi-judicial to 
describe administrative functions which are judicial 
in character. However, of ten such labelling was 
rather artificial, appearing to depend largely upon 
whether the courts wished to apply the rules of 
natural justice or not. 
29. For general discussion of the duty to act fairly 
see Caldwell, 1980 b. It is sometimes said that 
the duty to act fairly does not apply to an adminis-
trative body exercising functions that are I islative 
in form (e.g. exercising a power to make regulations) 
but this is not the New Zealand position. See CREEDNZ 
(supra, p. 189). 
30. CREEDNZ p. 177. 
31. CREEDNZ (supra). 
32. Denton v Auckland City [1969] NZLR 256. But compare 
EDS v NWASCA (1980) 7 NZTPA 385 where the court 
declined to require that the Authority give an 
opportunity for objectors to comment on a report 
of the Regional Water Board concerning whether a 
Crown water right should be granted. Provision 
in the Act for appeal from the decision of the 
Authority gave adequate protection to the interests 
of objectors. 
33. For further discussion see Rawlings, 1980. 
34. Mahon J. in Anderton v Auckland City Council is of 
the view that legislation will not override the 
first category (direct pecuniary interest). 
35. In CREEDNZ (supra) the court rejected a claim of 
bias. was in the nature of the legislation 
that Ministers must have formed views before advising 
the Governor-General in Council. Further examples 
of statutory overridillg of the bias rules include 
the Town and Country Planning Act (Councils must propose 
schemes and adjudicate on them); the Water and Soil 
Conservation Act (Minister of Works is Chairman of 
NWASCA which has power to decide Crown water rights). 
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36. Where an application for review is concerned with 
the National Development Act, the application 
37. 
must be made to the Court of Appeal not to the High 
Court as is the usuil case. 
This includes breach of the rules of natur justice. 
38. The courts will intervene where an error of law is 
apparent from the record of the proceedings (the 
decision read in conjunction with the relev8.nt 
statutory provisions), even though the tribunal 
has not exceeded its jurisdiction. However, there 
will be a few errors of law which do not result in 
the tribunal exceeding its jurisdiction. 
39. s4(2). 
40. s 4 (2A). 
41. s 4 (5). 
42. It is not easy to define when proceedings are 
against the Crown but in general it refers to actions 
against the Governor-General, Ministers and other 
government servants in their official capacity. 
43. Environmental Defense Society v South n-
ium Ltd. [1981] 1 NZLR 146 (CA). 
the other remedies are sought does 
the court from ordering discovery, so long as a 
declaration is also sought and is properly claimed. 
!iK v Minister of Immigration [1981] 1 NZLR 235 (CA). 
For further discussion see Hannan:, 1981. . 
44. Formerly, a claim by the Crown of public interest 
immunity (or privilege) presented a major obstacle 
to discovery of Crown documents. If a Minister 
objected to production, certifying that disclosure 
was not in the public interest, the Court would not 
question his decision. Now, however, they are 
prepared to inspect the relevant documents to assess 
for themselves whether the public interest in 
disclosure is out-weighed by the public interest in 
non-disclosure. T11e power to inspect wi 11 be spar-
ingly exercised in relation to current government 
policy papers, government advice to the Governor-
General and cabinet discussion papers. EDS v 
South Pacific Aluminium Ltd (No.2) [1981T1 NZLR 
153. (AI though the court exercised its power to 
inspect in this case, after doing so it held 
disclosure was not required in the interests of 
justice) . 
4 5 • n i um Ltd. ( sup r a, not e 43). 
s not necessarily 
confined to the proceedings. Even though an action 
is unsuccessful on 1 al grounds the information 
obtained may prove useful for political persuasion. 
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46. This issue is also very important in relation to 
rights of participation under various statutes 
concerned with the environment. The question of 
who has standing is governed by statutory inter-
pretation in those cases. 
47. See for example Collins v Upper Butt Ci ty Corpora.tion 
[1961J NZLR 250; v Agricultural Chemicals Board 
[1973] 2 NZLR 758. However the courts are not -
consistent. Sometimes they simply ignore the question 
of standing altogether. (Caldwell, 1982) 
48. Wybrow v toral Offi [1980] 1 NZLR 147. 
49. EDS v Ag. Chern. Bd. (supra). 
50. See for example, Cane, 1980jCappelletti, 1981;' 
Cappelletti and Jolowicz, 1975; Davis, 1970; Holm, 
1979; Stein, 1979; Smillie, 1978; Stone, 1974; 
Williams, 1980; Jolowicz, 1983. 
51. A minority of the Committee expressed reservations 
as to whether the test proposed by the majority 
would help public interest litigants and put forward 
an alternative proposal. 
52. EDS v South Pacific Aluminium Ltd (No.3) (supra). 
53. Inland Revenue Commissioner v National Federation 
OfSel f-employed and SmaJTBusiilesses Ltd .. [ 1981] 
2 A11 ER 93. The Court stated, lIit would be a 
grave lacuna in our system of law if a pressure 
group ... 01' even a single public spirited taxpayer 
was prevented by outdated rules of locus standi from 
bringing [a] matter to the attention of the Court 
to vindicate the rule of law and get the unlawful 
conduct stopped~1I 
54. The Court of Appeal seems to be leaning toward a 
test for standing which resembles the II zone of 
interest" test often adopted in the United States. 
For criticism of that test see Davis, 1970. 
55. See above pp. 57-8. 
i 
CHAPTEH FOUR 
1. The concept of the Act was promoted by Joseph Sax 
in his book Defendln€L1Jle Environment. He was also 
responsible for drafting the Act. For disqussion 
of the operation of the Act see Sax and Conner, 1972; 
Haynes, 1976. For a critical review of Defend 
The Environment see Jaffe, 1971. 
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2. For a list of States adopting similar legislation 
see DiMento, 1977, note 4, and Van Tol, 1979. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
s 2 
s 3 
s 4 
s 2. 
s 4 
s 5 
s 5 
( 1) . 
( 1) . 
( 1) . 
(2). 
(2) . 
( 1) . 
10. This is reinforced by placing the burden of 
proving likelihood of harm or justifying any harm 
caused on the defendant. As Krier (1970) points 
out this should not be an onerous task if the 
defendant has in fact duly weighed environmental 
factors and considered alternative options before 
undertaking the challenged activity. 
11. This is more popularly known as the "Yes Minister ll 
syndrome. 
12. The courts do have the power to appoint experts but 
this power does not impress those who doubt the 
expertise of the courts. It does not sufficiently 
remove the problem of lack of expertise and creates 
its own problems. Some of these problems have 
been outlined by Mahon (1979). If the court 
appointed expert simply reports to the court with-
out any opportunity to present counter-arguments, 
this must cast doubt about the fairness of the trial. 
On the other hand, if cross-examination is permitted 
little has been gained because the judge must still 
decide between conflicting expert evidence. If 
he automatically accepted the opinion of the court 
expert, the expert would, in effect, take over the 
role of the judge. 
13. Julius Stone, quoted in Lloyd, 1979 p. 819. 
14. The scope of traditional judicial review, as 
opposed to review on the merits, is defined by 
the grounds of review, discussed in Chapter Three. 
Thus extending standing raises no major difficulties. 
15. The American courts seem prepared to adopt the sort 
of approach suggested here. In Scenic Hudson v 
FPC [1965] 1 En 1084 the U.S. Court 
ordered the Federal Power Commission to consider a 
number of alternatives which the record of its 
proceedings disclosed it had ignored. 
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